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1. Introduction 
 
"Our times demand a new definition of leadership - global leadership. They demand a 
new constellation of international cooperation - governments, civil society and the 
private sector, working together for a collective global good." 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
Speech at World Economic Forum 
Davos, Switzerland (29 January 2009) 
 
The words of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon materialise well the spirit of recent 
years, which have seen the creation of several global multi-stakeholder governance 
initiatives –and even more academic literature on the topic. Within these initiatives, 
governments, private companies and civil society groups collaborate to make decisions. 
Global multi-stakeholder governance is claimed to involve horizontal, instead of 
vertical power relations, and it typically addresses border-crossing issues 
(Swyngedouw, 2005). The emergence of such coalitions reflects changes in how the 
roles of different state, private and non-governmental actors are commonly perceived. 
In development policy, this change is reflected in the rise of a developmental paradigm 
that considers private capital and non-state actors as engines for development 
(Lundsgaarde, 2010). 
The surge of multi-stakeholder governance initiatives owes to changes that have altered 
world politics in the past decades. Multi-stakeholderism breaks the traditional lines 
between those governing and those to be governed. To understand the increasing 
popularity of multi-stakeholder schemes, it is necessary to pay attention to two parallel 
developments: increase in global trade and investment, and the strengthening of global 
civil society networks (Kumar, 2008). Multi-stakeholderism can be understood as a 
compromise between these two often competing tendencies. A feature both of these 
tendencies share is the increased importance of non-governmental and private actors in 
decision-making. 
Firstly, the intensification of economic globalisation, together with the ideological 
spread of market values, has intensified competition over global markets (Sawyer & 
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Gomez, 2008). Both companies and governments compete to attract investors and 
generate economic growth. Companies are searching for new markets and investment 
opportunities globally, and stronger engagement in the world economy is widely 
considered beneficial for developing countries. In addition to trading internationally, 
this means joining the competition to attract foreign investments. Major development 
institutions, such as the OECD, highlight the importance of private capital flows for 
development. “Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an integral part of an open and 
effective international economic system and a major catalyst to development” (OECD, 
2002, p.7).  
Many developing countries have established investor-friendly policies. Mozambique, 
the research setting for this case study, adopted in 1993 an investment law that 
welcomes foreign investors (UNCTAD, 2001). Overall FDI flows to developing 
countries have increased significantly since 1990 (UNCTAD, 2013, p.106). FDIs are 
thought to benefit all parties: For companies they are a business opportunity and for the 
host country they can provide a source of economic development, income and 
employment if wisely managed (OECD, 2002, p.5). Countries compete to attract 
investments, and companies compete over markets and resources. However it is a 
competition in which parties have an interest to cooperate. International trade 
quintupled from 1990 to 2012 (WTO, 2014) so it is not surprising that economy is a 
central theme in contemporary world politics. At the same time, corporations have 
assumed many tasks of the government (Sawyer & Gomez, 2008). 
The second key factor explaining the popularity of multi-stakeholder governance is the 
rise of transnational civil society. The 1990s saw the birth of globalised civil society 
networks that united behind border-crossing agendas (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Civil 
society groups were increasingly invited to engage in the work of the United Nations, 
the World Bank and the World Trade Organization. Global civil society movements 
often campaigned against multinational corporations and economic globalisation, which 
caused disruptions at the local level. (Tuodolo, 2009.) One prominent movement at this 
time began to demand international oil companies to disclose their payments to host 
governments. Global Witness, a British non-governmental organisation, published a 
report called A Crude Awakening, which criticised the complicity of international oil 
and banking industries in the plundering of state petroleum assets in Angola, and 
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demanded the publication of payments to the government. A global network of CSOs 
called Publish What You Pay was formed behind the agenda. (EITI, 2014c.) This 
campaign was central to the emergence of the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI), a global governance coalition established in 2002. Its multi-
stakeholder board sets a standard for the disclosure of payments that oil and mining 
companies make to governments and the revenue the governments receive from the 
companies. The establishment of the EITI reflects a shared interest in a middle-way 
between competing and parallel visions of development that is claimed to both 
strengthen the global business climate and empower global civil society groups.  
The 1990s witnessed the expansion of market liberalism. State intervention in the 
economy was seen as inefficient, and the role of the state was restricted to guaranteeing 
stabilising institutions, such as property rights. Free trade agreements increased, and 
several developing countries increasingly adopted market economy. (Harvey, 2005, 
pp.1-5.) In development the prevailing ideological setting was known as the 
Washington Consensus (Williamson, 2004). The growth of international trade, the 
emergence of global civil society networks –often opposed to the policies of the 
Washington Consensus and demanding responsible behaviour from multinational 
corporations– and a change in how the role of the state was perceived were trends that 
occurred simultaneously. In the cross-section of these trends rose a demand for 
governance mechanisms that would reflect the change in global politics. As Virginia 
Haufler (2010) writes “(t)he focus on corporate disclosure fit well with the global 
normative environment, in which ideas of democracy, market efficiency, and corporate 
responsibility dominate”. 
This study aims to analyse the political rationalities behind multi-stakeholder 
governance and the dynamic roles of governments, companies and civil society in the 
governance of mineral resources. It focuses on the EITI in the context of Mozambique, 
a resource-rich country with one of the lowest Human Development Index scores in the 
world (UNDP, 2014b).  
Studying the material implications of the EITI on Mozambican society, or its ability to 
reach the desired goals, is beyond the scope of this study. The EITI as a political 
process is itself an interesting case of a new mode of governance and development 
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policy, where multiple stakeholder groups are involved within a globally set framework 
of governing. This study explores the different actors’ views on the EITI as a tool for 
governing mineral resources in Mozambique. I explore the ways how the increased role 
of private and non-governmental actors in development policy is conceptualised by 
government officials, civil society, extractive companies and development partners 
working on or around the EITI in Mozambique.  
The main research questions of this study are as follows: 
1) How are the extractive industries rendered governable through the EITI? 
2) How are different rationalities and techniques of governance shaping what is 
considered governable through the EITI in Mozambique? 
The economy of Mozambique is growing rapidly and undergoing considerable changes. 
Large deposits of coal and natural gas have been discovered in the northern parts of the 
country. They could potentially turn Mozambique into one of the world’s largest 
producers of these commodities. (ICF International, 2012.) The vast natural resources 
hold great promise to this low-income country but many fear that if badly governed, 
these resources will not benefit the majority of the population. This concern stems from 
gruesome conflicts and inequality related to the so-called ‘resource curse’ experienced 
in some other resource-rich African states (see e.g. Humphreys et al., 2007). 
Mozambique also has relatively poor governance record (e.g. “failing” score in the 2013 
Resource Governance Index).  
Multi-stakeholder governance mechanisms lift the private sector and civil society into 
the decision-making arena with governments. The EITI sets a standard for the multi-
stakeholder governance of the extractive industries. It focuses on disclosure of 
government revenues and company payments, although its mandate was extended in 
2013 to cover the entire value chain more extensively. The EITI is a voluntary 
governance scheme for countries and binding for companies operating in the 
implementing countries. Civil society, industry and governments are represented on 
different levels of decision-making. The standard promises to benefit all the three 
groups, a reason for each one to commit to working together. There are now 31 EITI 
compliant countries and 17 candidate countries. Currently half of EITI countries are in 
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Africa but several G7 countries have also committed to implementing the EITI. The 
United States became an EITI Candidate country in March 2014. (EITI, 2014a.) 
To be able to analyse the EITI, it is necessary to recognise its two key principles: 
transparency and multi-stakeholderism. Global scrutiny of state expenditure, demands 
for governments to allow access to information and creating platforms that bring non-
state actors to make decisions on matters that previously were considered to belong to 
the sphere of the sovereign state, all reflect a change in how the roles of state and non-
state actors are perceived. Multi-stakeholderism is seen as a mechanism to address 
issues that states have failed to address on their own (Benner et. al, 2004; Fransen & 
Kolk, 2007), including corruption, irresponsible management of natural resources and 
regulation of global business. This is not to claim that these concerns have not been 
addressed by traditional state measures. Both the United States and the European Union 
have passed laws that require mandatory disclosure of extractive company payments to 
governments, although the legislations are yet to be regulated (PWYP, 2015a, 2015b). 
This shows that multi-stakeholder governance mechanisms are one response among 
others to commonly defined problems.  
Mozambique became an EITI candidate country in 2009 and was declared compliant 
with the EITI Rules in October 2012 (EITI, 2014d). The Government of Mozambique 
expects revenues from extractive industries to increase rapidly (GoM, 2011). At the 
same time, civil society actors have pointed out the tight connections between the 
political elite and business (e.g. Machel, 2012) and many have doubted whether the 
local population will profit from the resource boom (e.g. Gqada, 2013). The negative 
social impacts of the growing extractive sector have already been felt in Mozambique. 
Especially the way resettlement of local population was conducted around the coal 
mines in the province of Tete, has triggered criticism and protests (Human Rights 
Watch, 2013).  
Ensuring the resources create state revenue and that the revenue is utilised in a prudent 
and productive manner is a development challenge for Mozambique. Sustained income 
inequality has provoked concerns that the rapid economic growth of recent years is not 
benefitting the poorest (Virtanen & Ehrenpreis, 2007; James et al., 2005). Exploring 
mechanisms that aim to stream profits from natural resources to poverty reduction is a 
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highly relevant subject to Development Studies. Equally important is facing the 
limitations these mechanisms have and analysing the power relations behind and within 
them. Despite growing literature on multi-stakeholder governance, case studies 
analysing the mechanisms of the EITI are still relatively scarce (Etter, 2014; Meissner, 
2013; Wilson & Van Alstine, 2014). 
In the next section, I will set the foundations for exploring the research questions by 
presenting theoretical approaches around the concept of governmentality. In the third 
section, the methodological orientations of the study will be explained. Section four will 
provide an overview of the EITI’s requirements and the criticism it has received, as well 
as contextualise the EITI in the political-economic setting of Mozambique. In the fifth 
and sixth sections, I will analyse how the EITI is understood within the Mozambican 
context in order to understand the political rationalities and techniques supported by 
different stakeholders. The final section provides conclusions concerning the different 
techniques of governance shaping mineral resource governance in Mozambique and the 
functions stakeholder groups assign to the EITI and to different actors in governing the 
extractive sector. 
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2.  Theoretical approach: Understanding governance through 
governmentality 
2.1 The analytics of governmentality 
This chapter will introduce central concepts for analysing rationalities behind the EITI 
as a governance mechanism. It will draw on Michel Foucault’s understanding of power, 
especially from the latter part of his career from the late 1970’s onwards. The 
application of these ideas to research on contemporary forms of governance will be 
explored, and a view of neoliberalism as a political rationality will be explained. A post-
Foucauldian perspective is chosen because it recognises that power is always present, 
ideas reflect and consolidate power, and power is never the privilege of one actor. 
Foucault considers governance as the field of strategic games between those governing 
and those to be governed (Foucault, 1988, pp.19).  
As Foucault (1982, p.791) stated, “a society without power relations can only be an 
abstraction”. The dynamics of power relations in multi-stakeholder governance, and the 
changes in relations multi-stakeholder mechanisms reflect and generate are questions 
that inspire this study. Increasing understanding of the political philosophy that multi-
stakeholderism represents is necessary not least for legitimacy’s sake. In this study, the 
EITI Mozambique process is explored as a representation of changes in relations 
between a variety of state, private and non-governmental actors. Drawing on the 
theoretical approach on governmentality developed by Michel Foucault, this study aims 
to increase understanding of how problems of governance and their solutions are 
defined, and how different actors define the rationalities assigned to manage them.  At 
the theoretical core are political rationalities, “the changing discursive fields within 
which the exercise of power is conceptualised” (Rose & Miller, 1992, p.175). 
The concept of governmentality is central for understanding the workings of power in a 
society, with its view of power as something reflected in and shaped by techniques of 
governance and political practices. From the point of view of governmentality, 
governance concerns the ‘conduct of conduct’ of both the self and of others. ‘Conduct 
of conduct’ is a wordplay that takes advantage of the several senses of the word 
‘conduct’. The Merriam-Webster dictionary gives it the following meanings: 
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1
con·duct 
noun \ˈkän-(ˌ)dəkt\  
: the way that a person behaves in a particular place or situation 
: the way that something is managed or directed 
Foucault used the term governmentality to describe the conduct of the conduct of the 
self and others. He strived to grasp what characterises the exercise of power, and the 
mechanisms which construct one’s will and understanding of how things ought to be. 
(Neumann & Sending, 2010, p.19.) Other researchers have later reinvented 
governmentality as an analytical tool to understand changes in global and local politics 
in the 21
st
 century (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Lemke, 2002, 2007; Rose & Miller, 1992; 
Rose et al., 2006). In this study,  governmentality is used to describe the technologies of 
governing the conduct of others in the social and political spheres, leaving out 
theorisation on the governance of the self. An analysis of governmentality seeks to 
identify the styles of thought which rationalise action, how they are formed, the 
principles they borrow from, the techniques and practices through which they are 
carried out and their relationship with other forms of governance (Rose et al., 2006). I 
will examine the EITI, a global multi-stakeholder governance mechanism, as a 
technology of governance that is both the product of political rationalities and a 
platform and mechanism for redefining them. First I will take a brief look at the 
relationship between the concepts of governmentality and governance, and argue why 
the former is considered a useful analytical concept to study the latter. 
From the point of view of governmentality, no actor is above pulling strings or immune 
to technologies of governance. The relevance of this thinking for understanding multi-
stakeholderism is evident. Even though Foucault’s scope did not involve multi-
stakeholder governance as we see it today, the idea of governance as something not tied 
only to formal institutions and the state apparatus in general, provides an analytical 
starting point to understanding the EITI. Governmentality refers to the connection 
between mentality, collective thought, and techniques of governance.  Thought is a 
practice of governing as well as an action that shapes governance. It is embedded in the 
art of governing and conducted in the practices of governing. Here the interest is in 
collective thought and discourses; a mentality shared by many but which is not stable 
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and which also includes the possibility of critique. Governmentality through its various 
technologies affects thought and our perception of ‘truth’. (Dean, 2010, pp. 21-50.)  
Governmentality provides analytical tools to understand forms of governance. Since the 
1980’s the term governance has become a popular concept and almost a buzzword to 
describe practically any attempt to address a problem through mechanisms that often 
reach beyond the state (Lemke, 2007). Literature on global governance has explored 
these mechanisms in a transnational sphere. At the core of the global governance 
discussion is the heightened role and influence of non-state actors that challenge the 
state’s sovereignty in a kind of zero-sum game. The mechanisms through which state 
actors encourage the participation of non-state actors, as well as the contents and logic 
of relations between state, private and non-governmental parties remains underexplored. 
(Neumann & Sending, 2010, pp.1-17.) This suggests that instead of the state ‘losing’ 
power to other sectors, governmental rationalities containing ideas of how to govern 
may have changed.  Brand (2005) suggests that the discourse of global governance has 
become hegemonic in international politics. Typical to this discourse is the assumption 
that problems occur on a transnational sphere and require transnational solutions. 
Cooperative concepts of policy, aiming at ‘win-win’ situations are privileged to fill the 
regulatory void caused by the loss of the nation-state’s ability to control. Capitalist 
competition is uncontested, and western expert knowledge largely defines problems and 
solutions. Unequal power relations remain underexplored. (Brand, 2005.) 
As Lemke (2007) points out, the popular policy-oriented governance discourse and the 
analytics of governmentality have much in common. However, Lemke notes that 
policy-oriented governance discourse often portrays governance models as a 
technocratic solution to increasingly complex situations, and does not explore the power 
relations from which the roles of actors originate.  The roles assigned to actors, the 
problematisations and proposed solutions often linked to the global governance 
discourse can be understood as part of a longer neoliberal trajectory of shaping the roles 
of actors in decision-making (Brand, 2005). Analysing the EITI from a governmentality 
perspective sets it in a wider framework of governance solutions stemming from a 
neoliberal political rationality (Beeson & Firth, 1998; Weiss, 2009).  In the analytics of 
governmentality the spheres of politics and economy and the concepts of state, private 
sector or civil society are not taken as given or power considered a zero-sum game. 
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Governance, when analysed through the framework of post-Foucauldian 
governmentality, concerns affecting the capacities of actors, their room for manoeuvre. 
(McKee, 2009.) What is perceived as plausible, rational or legitimate is built upon 
political rationalities and guides the conduct of actors. These rationalities are both 
enacted and shaped by techniques of governance.  
This point of departure is relevant for studying the EITI as the initiative can be seen as 
including the redefinition of the roles and responsibilities of actors, and searching for 
solutions to an issue that is perceived as a problem. This contains also a redefinition of 
the desirable conduct by different actors.  As Krause Hansen (2010) writes about the 
governance of corruption, the aim is to conduct the behaviour of the actors towards non-
corrupt practices. Practices are not shaped in a vacuum, but vis-à-vis other actors. 
Different actors participate in the formulation of the problem, attempting to line it with 
their own strategies. (Krause Hansen, 2010, pp. 117-136.) 
Thought translates into governmental programmes through the act of defining problems. 
The twelve EITI Principles, agreed in 2003 by selected governments, companies and 
CSOs reflect a compromise to define a collective understanding of a problem and a 
solution. As Rose and Miller (1992) point out, problematisation is central for 
governmentality. Its ideals set the form and scope of governing. Problems to be 
politically addressed, e.g. corruption, poverty or lack of transparency, are not neutral 
knowledge or a representation of reality (Lemke, 2002). However, the two, the idea and 
reality, are not independent from each other either. “I think there is a relation between 
the thing which is problematised and the process of problematisation. The 
problematisation is an ‘answer’ to a concrete situation which is real.” (Foucault, 1985, 
p. 115.) Problematisation is an element of political rationalities, “the changing 
discursive fields within which the exercise of power is conceptualised” (Rose & Miller, 
1992, p.175.) It is a process in which the exercise of power becomes ‘rational’; it is 
indeed a part of governance itself (Lemke, 2002). Rational in this case refers to any 
form of thinking that aims to be systematic, clear and calculative about how things 
should be governed and how they ought to be (Dean, 2010, p.19). Through defining 
problems, a sphere to be governed is produced, as well as knowledge about the nature of 
the problem (Rose & Miller, 1992.)  
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Political rationalities include moral justifications; they are rooted in knowledge and 
made thinkable through language. Rationalities materialise through governmental 
technologies, the programmes, techniques, statistics, speeches and documents that bring 
rationalities ‘into living’. (Rose & Miller, 1992.) For example, the discursive fields of 
transparency or ‘good governance’ can produce differing programmes. Programmes of 
governance both derive from political rationalities and simultaneously shape them by 
producing knowledge through techniques of governance. Programmes aim to affect the 
regimes of practices, the frameworks that define how certain issues are addressed in 
society and by whom or by which institutions. Regimes of practices have collective 
strategies that cannot be deducted to the intentions of a single agent but nevertheless are 
leaned towards certain ends and purposes. (Dean, 2010, pp.131-132.) Regimes of 
practices are both a product of technologies of governance and their subject.  
This matrix forms the art of governing that includes discourses, tactics and techniques. 
The analysis of the links between rationalities and techniques is a valuable way to 
understand the development of the EITI as a global governance mechanism, why 
governments sign up for the EITI and why companies and civil society groups support 
it. It also provides ways to understand the perceptions of actors involved in the EITI and 
how relations among them are shaped. 
As Dean (2010, pp.19-20) points out, governmentality involves morals in the sense that 
it includes an idea of how things ought to be and how individuals and collectives ought 
to conduct themselves. It involves competing ideal types that are manifest in the 
programmes of governanace. Governmentality builds on the idea that it is possible to 
achieve desired goals and improve society through the art of governing. Technologies of 
governance are what link the ‘desirable’ to what is ‘possible’ (Rose & Miller, 1992.) 
The role of knowledge as a technology steps in in formulating ‘truths’ about who we are 
and how we should govern and this way shaping identities and statuses (Rose, 1999, 
p.201).  
Values, from a Foucauldian perspectives are not a source of governmentality but a part 
of a matrix of rationalities and technologies of governance. Values are an expression of 
collective thought, mentalities of governance. Basing claims on values is a legitimising 
act, it renders certain techniques of governance ‘right’. It is a rhetorical practice, 
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translation of political rationalities into practice. (Dean, 2010, pp. 45-46.) Values shape 
our understanding of what ought to be and how we and others ought to conduct. The 
EITI is a strongly-value laden mechanism and it includes moral assumptions and 
expectations. These include that citizens should benefit from a country’s natural 
resources, the government should be accountable to the citizens, contracts and laws 
must be respected and that all companies should be treated equally (EITI, 2013). These 
views are both a translation of the political rationalities of the actors who have agreed 
on them and an expression of a collective thought, as well as a mechanism of 
governance that shapes political rationalities and what is expected of actors. 
According to Foucault (1980, p.131) each society has a regime of truth, which contains 
the discourses that are acceptable, mechanisms by which ‘false’ arguments may be 
distinguished from the ‘true’ ones and actors, groups and institutions that are granted 
the status of saying what counts as true. For Foucault, it was necessary to look into what 
governs statements that are considered legitimate and how these valuations are 
formulated. (Foucault, 1980, p.112.) The ‘regime of truth’ is a more general framework 
behind political rationalities and not necessarily tied to a certain society, as the 
production of knowledge has become more globalised. Political rationalities similarly 
reach a supranational scale, hand in hand with the programmes and technologies of 
governance. Issues such as alleviating poverty, enhancing security or ensuring the 
functioning of markets are problematisations that cross borders. The emergence of 
global governance as a solution to ‘global problems’ in academic discourse and political 
statements (Brand, 2005) is a part of the globalised processes of political rationalities 
and technologies of governance.   
Sawyer and Gomez (2008) make use of the concept transnational governmentality to 
explore how states, companies and international financial institutions work to facilitate 
resource extraction in the context of prevailing trade and investment liberalism. They 
analyse the unexpected consequences and interruptions that result when this art of 
governing meets the life sphere of indigenous people, and the roles of state and non-
state actors in governance. The study concludes that despite mechanisms to protect and 
consult indigenous people, extractive industries increasingly cause their 
marginalisation. Sawyer and Gomez argue that public-private partnerships endanger the 
state’s neutrality and capacity to protect these people. By examining the theoretical and 
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political origins of the initiative, this study will carefully consider the setting in which 
the EITI was created and continues to be legitimised. The main focus will, however, be 
in understanding the political rationalities present in the views of Mozambican 
stakeholders to gain understanding of how they reflect the perceived problems and roles 
of different actors.  
The term transnational governmentality was coined by Ferguson and Gupta (2002) to 
bring the concept of governmentality to reflect the emergence of transnational 
governance structures. Transnational organisations, such as international financial 
institutions, civil society coalitions and multi-stakeholder standards like the EITI, 
represent a novel art of governing. From a governmentality perspective the 
organisations themselves form part of technologies of governance but they also 
reproduce and reinvent political rationalities through tactics such as knowledge-
production. As Ferguson and Gupta (2002) note, these tactics include mechanisms of 
discipline and punishment, for example in the form of conditional aid. 
Transnational governmentality serves as a tool for understanding the roots of the EITI 
and its growing popularity in different countries. In the case of the EITI in Mozambique 
it however risks drawing and artificial line between the local and transnational spheres. 
Can it not after all be presumed that all the problematisations and political rationalities 
can potentially reach a transnational scale, while none of them exist in a global vacuum 
or are understood similarly across spaces? The term tends to draw an imaginary line 
between local and global rationalities and technologies of governance. Ferguson and 
Gupta’s (2002) and Sawyer and Gomez’s (2008) observations will however serve as an 
important basis for understanding the nascence of the EITI. 
2.2 Neoliberal governance and the changing roles of actors 
When thinking about governance through terms of governmentality, analysis does not 
place the state on a special throne. Relations of power and authority are viewed through 
a wider lens in which the state is one element among others. An analysis of 
governmentality deconstructs the ‘mythicized abstraction’ of the state.  The state has 
often been understood as a unified block in political science, and the complexity of its 
institutions and competing strategies within it have been overlooked. A governmentality 
approach focuses on how we govern, and how we are governed instead of asking who 
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governs and how has this agent or group secured its position. (Dean, 2010, pp. 34-36.) 
This view makes analytics of governmentality a specifically useful way to look at 
changes in the role of the state. Governmentality is not a tactics to be applied by the 
state, the state itself is a tactics of governance that consolidates power relations in 
society. As governance involves interaction between thought and technologies of 
governing and is thus in constant flux, strategic games and aims to ‘conduct the 
conduct’ of others transform materialisations of governmentality, including the state 
apparatus. 
According to Foucault, “power relations are rooted in the system of social networks” 
(Foucault, 1982, p.793). This view emphasizes that when analysing authority, political 
power and possible changes in them, one must look beyond the state. However, 
Foucault argued that power relations were ‘governmentalised’ in modern society. They 
were mainly centralised in the form of state institutions or under their patronage. 
(Foucault, 1982, p.793.) Foucault refers to this as the ‘governmentalisation of the state’ 
(Foucault, 1991; Lemke, 2002). Political rule and other projects are networked by ever-
changing relations and divisions. It has been argued that the state is a central locus, 
through which programmes of governance work. In order to operationalise a 
programme, one must ally with or work through state-controlled institutions. The state 
is a central hub, a crossing point of the most influential technologies of govening. A 
central hub is a way of passage for resources that flow around and through the 
technologies of the centre. (Rose & Miller, 1992.)  
In recent years, this view has been challenged as private and non-governmental actors 
have assumed tasks from governments (Sawyer & Gomez, 2008). Knowledge 
production and securing basic services have increasingly become the responsibility of 
non-state actors.  Private and non-governmental actors have begun to play an 
increasingly central role also in the processes and networks that define the agenda of 
global politics (Neumann & Sending 2010, p.110). Governmentality offers interesting 
aspects to the changes that the role of the state has faced in the neoliberal era.  
Foucault understood liberalism as a political rationality, rather than an ideology. To 
Foucault liberalism was a way of governing, arising as a critique of excessive 
governance by authorities. (Rose et al., 2006). As Hindess (1993) notes, from a 
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Foucauldian perspective liberalism is not merely a political ideology promoting 
individual liberty in relation to the state. The sphere of individual liberty, 
responsibilities and rights placed on the individual, is a product of governing. It reflects 
interventions, the technologies of governing that shape what is considered a desirable 
form of life. (Hindess, 1993.) These roles and responsibilities are structured through 
“strategic games between liberties” (Foucault, 1988, p.19). It is in these strategic games 
that actors aim to conduct the conduct of others. Structuring the conduct of others is not 
necessarily restricting; it can also increase the responsibility or decision-making 
opportunities of others. It may further their interests, open up options for them and 
empower them to take decisions. (Lemke, 2002.) 
The key to distinguishing neoliberal governance from earlier forms of liberal 
governance is the integration of governmental mechanisms developed in the private 
sector into the state’s sphere. Liberalism sought to establish a balance between the 
separate spheres of the state and markets. (Ferguson, 2010.) Neoliberal changes in state 
policies such as deregulation, privatisation and the adaptation of a market logic of 
efficiency can be understood as the retreat of the state. From a governmentality point of 
view, however, the change is understood as different governance, not less governance. 
“Far from bringing less government, neoliberalism will bring a different type of 
government and inserted at a different site: a new site of truth, a new application of 
power, and a new set of demands on conduct” (Gane, 2008, p.358). More responsibility 
is placed on non-state actors (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002). The relation between state and 
non-state actors has changed and governmental tasks of governance have partly been 
replaced by private and voluntary ones.  ‘Institutional ensembles of governance’ that 
involve and empower various stakeholder groups in a horizontal decision-making are a 
materialisation of the change in governance. They are viewed as more efficient and 
more democratic than decision-making solely within the state apparatus. (Swyngedouw, 
2005.) These changes in governance can be seen as reflections of a neoliberal political 
rationality (Beeson & Firth, 1998; Weiss, 2009). 
John Braithwaite (1999) notes that a “new regulatory state” has replaced both the 
classical liberal nightwatchman state and the Keynesian welfare state. The state is 
expected to row less but steer more, following Braithwaite’s metaphor. Two important 
points can be highlighted in Braithwaite’s concept of the regulatory state. The first is 
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that the state is not only regulating, it is also subject to regulation by international 
bodies. Neumann and Sending (2010, pp-1-17) also note the paradox that in a global 
polity neoliberal political rationality, although dictating less governing, is actually 
resulting in more global norms and rules. The second point Braithwaite (1999) makes is 
that the state is one actor among others, all steering and rowing mindful of each other. 
However, the structure of the EITI confirms that the state continues to be a central 
locus, and that its regulatory role is different from other actors. It is the government that 
signs up to implement the EITI, and it is the government’s responsibility to guarantee 
that companies meet disclosure requirements and that civil society operates in an 
enabling environment (EITI, 2013). 
McKee (2009) argues that the state has remained a central actor, even though it no more 
claims to provide comprehensive solutions to all of society’s problems. It remains a 
central driver of framing problems and solutions. Neumann and Sending (2010, p.112) 
correspondingly note that non-state actors are often financially supported by states and 
invited by them to participate in decision-making. Legislation remains a powerful 
means of translating a programme of governance into mechanisms that limit the 
capacities of others.  
Governmentality shapes the identity of actors, whether groups or individuals. 
Technologies of governing influence what actors perceive their own role and power to 
be. This does not mean that subjects are determined through governance. It means that 
governance influences, enforces and devalues certain statuses, qualities and capacities 
of actors. (Dean, 2010, pp.43-44.) How actors within or outside the state apparatus 
perceive their own role changes along with the modalities of governance. Neumann and 
Sending (2010, p.157) argue that an “increasingly effective liberal rationality is 
establishing itself worldwide, exerting structural pressure on the state to govern 
indirectly”. While the state may remain central in new forms of governance, such as the 
EITI, the prevalence of a neoliberal political rationality shapes how the state governs.  
At this stage the concept of neoliberalism requires some attention. Neoliberalism is a 
term that has in recent years been used rather ambiguously (Ferguson, 2010). Ferguson 
(2010) claims that neoliberalism is a term too often used ambiguously as a synonym to 
an evil external force. He suggests that neoliberal economic policies should be separated 
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from neoliberal techniques of governance. Bringing market-based techniques of 
governance into the state system and assigning citizens an active and responsible role 
does not necessarily entail the promotion of neoliberalism as an ideology. Understood 
as a set of techniques of governing, rather than a political project driving laissez-faire 
markets, neoliberal governance can take a variety of forms in different contexts.  
Ferguson points out that cash handout programmes aiming to improve basic income 
reflect neoliberal governance in that they place responsibility on the individual to make 
the choice on how to use the income. These pro-poor policies demonstrate that 
neoliberal techniques of governance are not inherently anti-poor, but can serve a variety 
of objectives. Because neoliberalism retrieves its legitimisation from democracy, 
windows of opportunity for the ‘powerless’ to influence policy are sometimes opened. 
(Ferguson, 2010.) This empowerment is in itself a technique of governance (Dean, 
2010, pp. 21-50).  
Governance is not inherently coercive or consensual. For Foucault (1982, p. 794): 
“Every power relationship implies, at least in potentia, a strategy of struggle”. Thus 
resistance is not about overthrowing governance, it is about exploring new ways of 
governance (McKee, 2009). Actors may withdraw from networks, formulate opposing 
programmes and refuse to cooperate. The level of conforming relies on the power 
relations in the network, on the actors’ ability to shape the conduct of others. Thinking, 
although an act influenced by technologies of governance, is also an act of exercise of 
power. Changes in the modalities of governmentality resemble changes in power 
relations and also produce them. Changes can also produce unintended consequences. 
(Rose & Miller, 1992.) For example, governance may open up space to novel 
productions of ‘truth’ and thus empowerment. However, empowerment may also be a 
technique, or even goal, of governing. (Dean, 2010, pp. 21-50.) This view on resistance 
highlights the strategic nature of power and its embeddedness in social relations.  It also 
brings out Foucault’s critique towards emancipatory projects, as emancipating is 
actually a form of structuring the possibilities of others, i.e. exercise of power. 
In the EITI, the spheres of state, market and society overlap in a way that suggests that 
as a form of governance it stems from a neoliberal rationality. Non-state and private 
actors are ‘empowered’ to take decisions on the governance of the extractive sector 
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alongside with the government. This type of governance is different from the early 20
th
 
century liberalism that Foucault sought to understand. Brown (2003) argues that 
neoliberal governance is legitimised by the state’s ability to ensure the efficiency of 
markets and that neoliberalism erodes liberal democracy and its central features such as 
civil liberties and government openness. Yet the regime of truth neoliberal governance 
builds upon shares elements with earlier forms of liberalism. Neoliberalism seeks to 
govern through freedom. (Rose et al., 2006). The EITI underpins Ferguson’s (2010) 
view that neoliberal governance can also build its legitimacy upon liberal democracy.  
Features that originate from an older liberal trajectory, such as the appreciation of 
individual liberty, active citizenship, accountability and rules protecting the liberties of 
others, are present in the EITI (Brown, 2003). The EITI demonstrates that neoliberal 
political rationality does not necessarily entail that economic liberalisation is the 
dominant governmental technique. Instead, novel forms of regulation can also be 
understood as neoliberal governance. Neoliberal political rationality can result in a 
variety of diverse governance techniques and mechanisms (Rose & Miller, 1992). 
Taking into account Ferguson’s critique, ‘neoliberal political rationality’ is not to be 
understood in this study as an over-arching explanation for changes in modes of 
governance in Mozambique or elsewhere. Nor is the purpose to claim that any 
governance mechanism borrowing from a neoliberal rationality is inherently anti-poor, 
right-wing, or imperialist. The on-going process of adapting and formulating EITI 
Mozambique is the interplay of different political rationalities colliding with each other 
in a context-bound setting of power relations. ‘Neoliberal political rationality’ is a 
useful analytical framework in this scheme because it gathers a matrix of knowledge 
and techniques of governing: values, ideas about the roles of the state and non-state 
actors, a network of institutions, and information and ideas about the economy. It 
represents a certain way of thinking, categorising and perceiving problems and 
solutions. 
The EITI can be seen as an attempt to structure the aspirations of actors and assigning 
specific roles and expectations to them. However, following a Foucauldian logic actors 
have opportunities to attempt to reshape the technologies of governance. Lemke (2007) 
notes that there has been a move from direct to indirect techniques of government and 
that new actors have appeared on the scene. Statehood is in transformation, which 
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means that the roles of non-state actors are also fluctuating. As Gaventa (2006) and 
Sawyer and Gomez (2008) note, governance mechanisms that promote civil society or 
citizen participation do not necessarily increase their influence on governance. New 
institutional arrangements that ‘empower’ citizens do not guarantee greater inclusion. 
Rather, much depends on the power relations forming and surrounding these shifitng 
governance mechanisms. (Gaventa, 2006.) 
2.3 Problematising the extractive sector 
Although Foucault himself operated on a theoretical level without applying his thoughts 
to empirical research, his understanding of power and its expressions provide a useful 
approach to analysing contemporary governance. In a certain way, governmentality 
works through visible technologies and results in tangible outcomes such as governance 
mechanisms, statements, the production of information and views on roles and 
responsibilities. A Foucauldian understanding of rationalities and techniques of 
governance is useful for analysing how extractive industries are rendered governable 
through the EITI. 
It is argued here that the EITI represents a mechanism of governance that is 
underpinned by neoliberal ideas of natural resource governance that emphasise the role 
of liberal democratic institutions, fair market competition and participation by private 
and non-governmental actors. EITI’s moral raison d’etre derives from two 
complementary principles: multi-stakeholderism and transparency. The historical and 
discursive origins behind the problematisations legitimising the EITI help understand 
how multi-stakeholderism and transparency have emerged as ‘solutions’ and techniques 
of governing the extractive industries.  
Multi-stakeholder standards as a form of global governance have increased and gained 
some scholarly attention in recent years.  Benner et al. (2004) view multi-stakeholder 
governance as a step away from the policies of Washington Consensus towards “re-
embedding liberalism”, i.e. setting social and environmental standards instead of solely 
agreeing on market liberalisation. This move can be described as shifting the objective 
from ‘less governance’ to ‘good governance’ (Weiss, 2000). This is in line with 
Neumann and Sending’s (2010, pp. 1-17) finding that neoliberal rationality is leading to 
more global regulation. Typically issues addressed my global multi-stakeholder 
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initiatives are border-crossing. They are considered as having horizontal, instead of 
vertical power relations and a high level of participation. (Benner et al., 2004.) Boström 
and Tamm Hallström (2010) see multi-stakeholder standards as creating fragile 
authority – authority understood here as legitimate power. The standards gain 
legitimacy by combining the authorities of each stakeholder group. Categorisation and 
defining who qualifies as a stakeholder constitutes a part of the process. As Boström 
and Tamm Hallström (2010) point out, legitimacy is relative and different stakeholder 
groups may have different perceptions of legitimate standard setting. Shaping 
understandings of legitimacy and legitimate participation are inherent to 
governmentality (Brown, 2003). 
In literature, global multi-stakeholder initiatives that bring together public sector, 
business and civil society tend to be seen as “gap-fillers” in an environment to which 
traditional forms of governance are considered as insufficient or ineffective (Benner et. 
al, 2004; Fransen & Kolk, 2007). “Stakeholder assemblies can be seen as sources for 
new global rule-setting involving non-state actors where ‘old’ public governance is 
failing and regulatory voids need to be filled” (Fransen & Kolk, 2007, p. 3). From a 
governmentality point of view the explanations for changes in how we govern are found 
in a deeper change in the political rationalities of governance. A description of the 
formal role of state in the extractive sector and the nature of extracting resources brings 
light on the issue.  
Extractive industries are very territorially bound. Unlike, for example, apparel 
manufacturing, mining or oil production cannot be easily transferred to a neighbouring 
country with lower labour or environmental standards. Resources must be extracted 
where they are found. While mining and petroleum companies often operate on a global 
scale, the resources are extracted from subsoil, which is a highly local, culture- and 
value-laden issue. Because of its extractive nature –taking something out of the soil that 
cannot be replaced– the sector is traditionally fairly regulated. Prospecting and 
extracting are often firmly under the control of the state. 
The basic, productive operations of extractive industries are limited to a certain physical 
territory. According to the tradition of international law, the nation-state has sovereignty 
over its acknowledged territory (e.g. Held, 2003, p. 162). There thus exists a nationally 
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and internationally fairly uncontested political entity that practises legislative power 
over the territories that extractive industries work in. The mode of production is not 
radically different from the ones found around the world in the previous centuries.. This 
observation challenges the ‘gap-filler’ argument and takes us towards explaining the 
emergence of multi-stakeholder governance in a different way. It also reminds that 
problematisations are not neutral mirrors of reality, but a part of political rationalities. 
That ‘old, state-centred forms of governance are inadequate’ and ‘transparency is 
necessary’ are problematisations that set ideas about legitimate exercise of power and 
‘rational’ action. 
Transparency is viewed by many as forming part of the cure to the problems of 
resource-rich developing countries (e.g. Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). Transparency is 
sometimes considered an end in itself, an inherent part of democratic society, and 
sometimes as a means to achieve other goods, from government accountability to social 
and economic development. Whether a means or an end, transparency has become a 
global norm (Haufler, 2010). The mechanism by which transparency leads to other 
goods, is unclear. Gupta (2008) argues that the mechanisms of whether and how 
transparency can lead to accountable, legitimate and effective governance require 
further scrutiny.  
The EITI is located in a crossing-point of several programmes that share transparency as 
a common denominator. As Haufler (2010) points out, different actors pursuing 
different campaigns, or governnance programmes, agreed on transparency as a solution 
to a variety of problems. These programmes have at their centre global-scale 
problematisations such as security, economic growth and market efficiency, and 
transparency is offered as a partial solution to them. As  I will explain in the next 
section, managing the so called ‘resource curse’ or ‘paradox of plenty’, by promoting 
efficient markets and fair competition between companies, together with the anti-
corruption paradigm, are the programmes, which constitute the foundations of the EITI. 
In the following, the origins of the ‘problems’, which the EITI attempts to address are 
examined.  
‘Resource curse’. The two principle problematisations associated with the governance 
of natural resources relate to the ‘resource curse’ discourse and to corruption as a factor 
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hindering development. The resource curse is commonly understood as a situation, 
where abundance of natural resources becomes a hindrance, rather than a motor, of 
economic and social development. It can entail anything from macroeconomic 
instability to armed conflict. The concept ‘resource curse’ is a discursive umbrella, a 
categorisation that covers diverse political and economic situations. The poor 
governance of resources is problematised as both a development and a security 
challenge.  
The concern over natural resources feeding into and prolonging conflicts in the 
developing world has played a part in the formation of the EITI. Preventing the 
‘resource curse’ is one of the overlapping agendas that consider transparency as a part 
of the solution. Civil wars in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Angola have been explained as economy of war based on exploiting mineral resources 
(Cilliers & Dietrich, 2000). Snyder (2006) notes that lootable natural resources can 
increase the risk of civil war, unless strong government institutions are in place. Sachs 
and Warner (1995) showed that in resource-rich countries, economic growth was slower 
in 1979-1989 than in countries poorer on natural resources. Similar findings were 
confirmed by Collier and Goderis (2008), who highlighted the importance of strong 
institutions that prevent politicians from redistributing resource wealth inefficiently to 
gain personal power. The sudden increase in income from natural resource extraction, 
resulting in other sectors becoming less competitive, is one of the negative 
macroeconomic effects linked to natural resource abundance (Ebrahimzadeh, 2012).  
In 2007, Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz edited a book called Escaping the Resource 
Curse, which confirmed that resources can lead to lower growth rates, greater volatility, 
more corruption, and, in extreme cases, devastating civil wars. The recommendations 
they provide centre on increasing transparency and competition and strengthening 
institutions. The authors note that stability is in the interest of both governments and 
extractive companies, and efforts to avoid harmful effects to the economy and society 
are beneficial for both. (Humphreys et al. 2007, pp. 322-328.) Studies often explain the 
resource curse as caused by a combination of weak institutions that allow rent-seeking 
behaviour (Mehlum et al., 2006) and patronage (Robinson et al., 2006), as well as 
macroeconomic disadvantages for other sectors of the economy. Kolstad (2007) gives 
priority to the development of institutions governing the private sector. 
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The negative impacts that mineral resources are said to cause range from exchange rate 
appreciation to corruption and full on armed conflict over control of resources. 
Institutions have been offered a key role in avoiding these harms (Mehlum et al., 2002; 
Robinson et. al, 2006; Collier & Goderis, 2008). Institutions that promote accountability 
and state competence help mitigate the effect of private incentives of politicians on the 
economy (Robinson et al., 2006). This links the resource curse discussion to a wider 
‘good governance’ discourse. The principles of good governance have their origin in the 
tradition of a constitutional state. Central pursuits include, for example, respecting the 
rule of law, strengthening democracy and participation, and promoting transparency in 
public administration. (Weiss, 2000.) This political vocabulary is the language of 
neoliberal political rationality. It is the point that ties together the different programmes 
behind the EITI.  
The argument that resources have an adverse effect on development has also been 
challenged. Davis (1995) notes that the resource curse seems to be an exception, rather 
than the rule, while others such as Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2006) and Luong and 
Weinthal (2006) have criticised the methodology of studies showing a link between 
natural resources and poor economic performance. Both Brunnschweiler and Bulte 
(2006) and Luong and Weinthal (2006) emphasize the importance of institutions that 
predate resource extraction for avoiding a negative correlation between natural 
resources and economic growth.  
Representing a different angle of critique towards the ‘resource curse’ discourse, 
Perreault and Valdivia (2010) argue that conflicts over resource governance cannot be 
reduced to war profiteering or resource abundance. Their comparative study of petro-
politics in Ecuador and Bolivia showed that conflicts over the governance of petroleum 
entailed a struggle between a neoliberal model of resource governance and a state-
centred one. Rather than a ‘scramble for wealth’, the conflict reflected profound 
differences in views of statehood, nationality, identity and culture. (Perreault & 
Valdivia, 2010.) Presenting resource-driven conflicts and economic challenges as 
caused by the incomplete adoption of liberal institutions draws attention away from 
alternative problems and solutions around natural resource governance. In the ‘resource 
curse’ thinking that derives from a neoliberal political rationality, the prevalence of 
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corruption and the space for economically inefficient rent-seeking behaviour are 
considered consequences of institutional fragility. 
Anti-corruption agenda. Sarah Bracking (2009) situates the EITI in a wider framework 
of a global anti-corruption campaign. Linking the initiative to a wider anti-corruption 
discussion gives insight into the origin and features of the EITI. Demonstrating 
commitment to anti-corruption is one of the benefits the initiative itself states that 
governments can gain from joining the process (EITI, 2013). Corruption here is 
understood in line with Wang and Rosenau’s (2001, p.26) definition as “collaboration 
between public officials and private actors for private financial gains in contravention of 
the public’s interest”. Corruption has gained more attention on the global arena in the 
past 20 years. Along with public awareness, global norms have emerged (Wang & 
Rosenau, 2001). The US and the EU have created stricter regulation to decrease corrupt 
practices of companies operating overseas. The UN Convention Against Corruption was 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2003. The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) has a Global Programme on Anti-Corruption for Development 
Effectiveness, which provides technical support. (UNDP, 2014a.) The World Bank 
Group has several initiatives that promote good governance and anti-corruption (World 
Bank Group, 2014). 
Several factors explain the emergence of anti-corruption as a global agenda. Since the 
end of the Cold War, western governments have less incentive to back corrupt 
governments. Part of this same process is the triumph of economic liberalisation that 
promotes less government intervention and more market competition. Transparency 
International (TI), a global civil society organisation, has been an important agent in the 
anti-corruption struggle. (Wang & Rosenau, 2001.) The founder of TI, Peter Eigen, 
chaired the International Advisory Group of the EITI in 2005 and was the first Chair of 
the EITI Board from 2006 until 2011 (EITI, 2014c). The logic of the anti-corruption 
agenda links tightly to the fundamental assumptions and goals of the EITI.  
Wang and Rosenau (2001) note that Transparency International (TI) has framed 
corruption as an issue of economic development, competitiveness and political 
accountability. TI has detached anti-corruption from a primarily ethical basis subject to 
criticism based on cultural relativism and has instead portrayed it as a practical, as well 
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as democratic and humanitarian, issue. In line with this, the EITI assumes that increased 
transparency and accountability improve governance, which can then lead to using 
revenues in a way that fosters economic growth and reduces poverty (EITI, 2013). 
Transparency International also harnesses the power of perception in its annual 
Corruption Perceptions Index. The index measures the perceived level of corruption in a 
country and then ranks countries according to the result. It is not based on actual levels 
of corruption, but how a country’s business environment is perceived by the 
international community, can have practical consequences. (Wang & Rosenau, 2001.) 
This perception is also built into the EITI’s logic. “(C)ompanies and investors want to 
invest in countries governed by transparency and fair rules”, states the EITI Progress 
Report 2009-2011 (EITI 2012a, p.15). Through the EITI, governments can signal that 
they are indeed committed to these values that stem from a neoliberal political 
rationality. 
Responsible companies in competitive markets. In addition to the EITI, there are other 
techniques of governance focusing on increasing transparency in extractive sector 
payments. It is worth noting that both the United States and the European Union are 
taking measures through legislation. The US and the EU have recently tightened 
transparency requirements for companies operating in the extractive industries overseas. 
The US was first to take the step in 2010.  Section 1504, “the Cardin-Lugar 
Amendment”, of the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
requires all oil, gas and mining companies reporting to the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to disclose payments made to foreign governments or companies 
owned by foreign governments. (CCDF-Terre Solidaire, 2013.) The EU had discussed 
similar reforms for a long time, and progress in the US added speed to the negotiations. 
In June 2013 an amendment to the EU Transparency Directive was passed, almost 
simultaneously with the G8 summit that revolved around trade, tax and transparency. 
The directive requires companies to disclose payments over 100,000 €. The EU went a 
step further than the US by adding logging and payments to big private companies to 
the directive’s scope. (O’Callaghan & Feldkamp, 2013.)  
The regulation reforms have not been unanimously applauded by industry. SEC was 
sued by the US Chamber of Commerce and two oil industry trade groups claiming that 
section 1504 will force US companies to reveal trade secrets to competitors 
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(Schoenberg, 2012). Lawsuits have slowed down efforts to pass regulation that would 
define exact guidelines for disclosure. The US Securities and Exchanges Commission 
has been requested to re-issue rules originally set in 2012. (PWYP, 2015a.) Several 
members of the trade groups behind the lawsuit are also involved in the EITI and have 
stated their support to the initiative. Some even have representatives on the global EITI 
Board. It is interesting to note that extractive companies resist increasing transparency 
through national legislation, a very state-centred form of governance, while supporting a 
multi-stakeholder governance mechanism in which they can participate in decision-
making.  
Companies listed in a stock exchange in the United States or the European Union have 
an interest to oppose national legislation but participate in the EITI. While the US and 
the EU can only impose regulation over companies they host, the EITI reaches all 
companies operating in an EITI implementing country. The EITI’s 11th principle states 
that “payments disclosure in a given country should involve all extractive industries 
companies operating in that country” (EITI, 2013, p.9). This sets the companies in an 
equal position and does not give advantage to companies from countries with less strict 
regulation. International NGO’s started demanding disclosure of payments in the early 
1990’s. Oil company BP was among the first to publish its payments to the Angolan 
government in the early 2000’s (Haufler, 2010). It paid a price for acting as a first 
mover as the Angolan government threatened to terminate the contract with BP for 
revealing confidential information. Other oil companies were not encouraged by the 
example and BP did not follow further with its voluntarily adapted transparency policy. 
(Millan, 2005.)  
Currently, over 90 oil, gas and mining companies support the EITI globally (EITI, 
2015). It is important to note that corruption is not beneficial for competitive 
companies. An environment where assets need not be wasted on bribing bureaucrats and 
contracting inefficient service providers owned by sons of politicians is the preference 
of competitive companies. However, if corruption is the only means to access contracts, 
national home-country transparency regulation can be a hindrance to companies based 
in the US or the EU. Non-competitive private companies may also rely on corruption to 
access contracts. (Wang & Rosenau, 2001.) It is more beneficial for western companies 
–and non-western companies trading stocks in Europe or America– that the neoliberal 
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political rationality translates into mechanisms demanding transparency worldwide, 
instead of being limited to its intellectual birthplaces, Western Europe and Northern 
America. The principle of a level playing field for all extractive companies furthers the 
neoliberal ideal of competitive markets. What needs to be noted is that companies have 
begun to give into, and even publicly support, demands for disclosure only after they 
were pressured to do so by transnational civil society campaigns. In the prevailing form 
of neoliberal political rationality, companies are not only assigned more influence than 
they had in a more state-centred era, but also more responsibilities. This reflects a shift 
away from the Washington Consensus to the re-regulation of liberalised markets, partly 
through multi-stakeholder governance (Benner et al., 2004).  
A neoliberal political rationality underpinning strong institutions that enable fair 
competition and framing resource conflicts as economically-driven translates into both 
state-centred solutions (national legislation) and hybrid governance mechanisms (EITI).  
Transparency is an element of ‘good governance’ that is in many ways central in current 
development discourse. The EITI has much in common with an anti-corruption agenda 
that predates it. The EITI focuses on matching payments made by companies to revenue 
received by governments so it brings into daylight especially high-level political 
corruption that distorts the functioning of markets. This links the EITI to the agenda to 
create free and fair global markets. Academic research, as well as civil society, has 
drawn lines between natural resources and security, economic growth and development. 
Many view the principles of ‘good governance’ as a factor that can turn resources a 
blessing for developing countries. The CSO Natural Resource Governance Institute, for 
example, collects a ‘Resource Governance Index’ that ranks resource-rich countries 
according to their governance performance, mainly focusing on legal frameworks, 
transparency and checks and balances. International non-governmental organisations 
(INGOs) have advocated for global standards promoting good governance in the 
extractive sector.  
The EITI is the meeting-point of the interlinked agendas of INGOs, donors and 
companies. A neoliberal political rationality underpins these agendas, which all share 
the idea that ‘good governance’ of the extractive industries enables good capitalism, 
including fair competition and institutional safeguards, which reduces conflicts and 
leads to ‘desired’ development.  
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Some scholars have suggested a more pluralistic approach to good governance. Olivier 
de Sardan (1999) notes that practices that from a neoliberal view seem corrupt, are in 
some contexts socially accepted customs. The rational-legal expectations towards civil 
servants exist side-by-side with cultural norms in favour of the pre-eminence of private 
interests. Beekers and van Gool (2012) in a similar fashion note that some 
neopatrimonial practices labelled as ‘bad governance’ by the conventional discourse can 
actually reflect a widely accepted understanding of good and legitimate governance. 
These practices, based on clientilism and patronage, have become embedded into 
modern bureaucratic systems in post-colonial states, which has resulted in hybrid 
models of governance.  
From a governmentality perspective, what is considered ‘good’ governance is not 
neutral. Political rationalities shape what is understood as legitimate and rational 
governance. Different understandings of how an issue should be governed shape 
mechanisms of governance. (Rose & Miller, 1992.) In this study, I will analyse how the 
political rationality behind the EITI and other understandings of governance are 
reflected and shaped in the views of Mozambican stakeholders. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Data collection 
This thesis is a case study of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in 
Mozambique. Yin (2003, pp.13-14) defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. Collected data 
consists of thematic interviews, which are analysed from the perspective of identifying 
similarities and differences, or patterns, in the way the interviewees perceive the EITI 
and the roles of different actors.  
The data consists of 20 thematic interviews, conducted in Maputo between December 
2012 and February 2013. The informants include the following: 
1.  Government officials engaged in the extractive sector, e.g. from the Ministry of 
Mineral Resources (references coded as GOV A-E) 
2.  Civil society: Local NGOs and research institutes engaged in or following the 
EITI process in Mozambique (references coded as CSO A-F) 
3. Bilateral and multilateral development partners, especially those engaged in the 
EITI Task Force (references coded as DEV A-C) 
4. Representatives of international companies working in the extractive sector in 
Mozambique (references coded as COM A-E) 
A list of interviews is included in Annex A. In thematic interviews the themes and 
issues were predefined but there was no fixed set list of questions that were asked in a 
specific order. The open form gave the informants the opportunity to bring out issues 
that they found important, to speak with their “own voice”. However, there was certain 
consistency between the information gathered, because similar themes were covered 
with all the infomants. (Eskola & Suoranta, 2008, pp. 86-87.) This form of interview 
was chosen because the informants represent different groups of actors. Therefore, 
using the same structured set of questions might not have been as fruitful. Through 
thematic interviews it was possible to have more informal-type of interaction with the 
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interviewees, reminiscent of a conversation, instead of a blunt question-answer 
dialogue.  
The four constituencies that were selected for interviews –government, civil society 
actors, companies and development partners– were identified based on their role in and 
influence on the EITI in Mozambique. Government, civil society and extractive 
companies form the multi-stakeholder core of the EITI. Development partners were 
interviewed due their role in promoting and supporting the EITI in Mozambique. I 
selected the informants based on their involvement in the EITI process and/or in the 
extractive sector. Some informants were very knowledgeable of the EITI, while others 
were involved in the gas and mining sector but followed the EITI from the outside. I 
contacted mining and petroleum companies with offices in Maputo, regardless of 
whether they had representation in the EITI multi-stakeholder group. Similarly, some 
civil society informants were actively involved in the EITI, while others were active in 
the extractive sector but not within the EITI. The same applied to interviewed 
government officials. I identified informants by following the local media, participating 
in seminars and similar public events, and through recommendations made by people 
familiar with the context, and through other informants. My internship at the Embassy 
of Finland from September to December 2012 offered valuable contextual schemes for 
data gathering, because I was able to map relevant stakeholder groups and key 
informants, as well as to build relavant informal networks. 
Despite some potential informants being unavailable for an interview, the sample 
represents all important stakeholder groups in a fairly balanced way. Accessibility of 
participants differed to some extent depending on the stakeholder group. Donor and 
company representatives were relatively easy to reach and willing to participate. They 
also provided me with plenty of time to conduct the interview. Representatives of civil 
society generally also made themselves readily available. In each of these groups there 
were however several interesting people, that I tried to contact without success. 
Representatives of the Mozambican government were the hardest group to access. To 
some extent this was probably caused by the ongoing holiday season. In this group, 
several persons I wanted to interview either did not reply to e-mails or phone calls at all, 
or advised me to speak to somebody else. One government representative was not 
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present when I went to meet him, and some of them had strict time restrictions for the 
interview. This did not necessarily have much to do with the subject of my research, 
several donors and journalists mentioned that getting appointments with government 
officials is challenging in Mozambique. 
As informants were experts and professionals and the EITI Mozambique is related to 
their work, most interviews were conducted at the office of the informant. Three 
interviews were conducted in cafés or restaurants outside working hours: one with an 
independent consultant, one with an civil society informant and one with a company 
representative. The locations were proposed by the informants and I followed Eskola 
and Suoranta’s (2008) suggestion that the informant should have the possibility to 
choose a setting that pleases him or her. The fact that most interviews were conducted 
during working hours and at the informant’s work place might have had an impact on 
the data. During working hours and at the work place it might be more likely that the 
informant follows the official position of the institution he or she works for. My 
informants were generally not critical towards their own stakeholder group or their 
employer. 
All the interviews were conducted in a way that only the interviewer and the informant 
were present. The informants were assured about the confidentiality of the data. Some 
informants would have permitted the use of their names in the study, but I chose to keep 
all informants anonymous. This was partly because the promise of anonymity made the 
informants speak more freely and partly because the information provided might harm 
the informants if their names were made public. Extractive industries and corruption are 
somewhat sensitive subjects in Mozambique, and rapid changes in the political setting 
might occur. As a researcher it is my responsibility to ensure as far as possible that this 
study cannot be used against any of my informants.  
3.2 Data analysis 
Preliminary data analysis preceded the choice to study the EITI Mozambique from a 
governmentality perspective. In this inductive process, the data led me to the chosen 
theoretical framework. After the fieldwork period, I wrote notes of first impressions of 
of the fieldwork and the data and continued this during the transcription of interviews. I 
found the first theoretical categories in this phase. ‘Silent’ knowledge acquired during 
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my six-month stay in Maputo helped to identify relevant themes in the interview data 
and connect them to the wider political and economic context of Mozambique. 
A systematic qualitative content analysis of the interview data was conducted after 
selecting the theoretical framework. Transcribed interviews were analysed to identify 
similarities and differences between different interviewee groups. During analysis, 
attention was given to how the interviewees viewed representatives of different 
stakeholder groups and which groups shared similar views. (See Kvale, 2007 for 
content analysis techniques.). Some issues were brought up by several informants, 
although they were not directly linked to a question. Positions towards a certain issue 
were analysed together, even if the informants had contradicting views on the matter. 
This gave an opportunity to compare perceptions and opinions and identify 
controversial topics. 
In the analysis, the data was linked tightly to its source. Attention was paid to which 
stakeholder group the informant represented, and the relation between the informant’s 
position and his/her statement. This was considered significant as the study focused on 
governance mechanisms in which the roles of and responsibilities of different actors are 
defined by dividing them into ‘stakeholder groups’. For example, an informant’s view 
of the responsibilities of the state might have been affected by his/her occupation. The 
director of a mining company, an NGO activist and a bureaucrat may have diverse 
opinions on rrights and responsibilities in resource governance, and for this study it was 
relevant to analyse how informants perceived the role of their own group and the roles 
of others in the governance of the extractive sector. 
3.3 The researcher’s position and research ethics 
The internship for the Embassy of Finland was highly useful in achieving an insight into 
Mozambique’s current political and economic situation. However, it also posed two 
kinds of challenges. The first related to the use of information and my role as an 
independent researcher. While employed by the embassy, I was not conducting 
fieldwork or operating as a researcher. However, the internship did shape my perception 
of Mozambican politics and even guided the selection of my research questions and 
informants. Without the internship prior to my fieldwork, it would have been more 
difficult to identify relevant research questions and themes for the interviews. There 
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were various pieces of information I accessed during my internship which shed light 
also on my research topic, but both research ethics and a legally binding contract with 
the employer prevented me from using this information here. Some of this information 
can be found in other sources, and thus I have used the opportunity to use them 
accordingly in my research.  
Another challenge was related to my position as a researcher. From time to time, I 
mentioned to some of the potential informants that I had conducted an internship at the 
embassy, and this probably opened some doors. Mozambique is one of Finland’s long-
term partner countries in development cooperation. Annual Finnish development aid to 
Mozambique is approximately €30 million. (Government of Finland, 2015.) Some of 
the NGOs, whose representatives I interviewed, had received funding from the Finnish 
government. To some extent, I was seen as a representative of a donor country by civil 
society representatives and probably also by several government and donor 
representatives.  
Despite these implications, I did find it justified that I in some situations brought up my 
affiliation to the embassy. Without doing so I might have not been able to access all the 
informants I in fact did. It is also possible that I am overestimating the effect the link to 
the embassy might have had. It is quite possible that my nationality and the fact that I 
came from a Finnish university on their own made people associate me with the 
development partners’ community. 
My position as a researcher gained another nuance when in November 2013, I started 
working for the EITI International Secretariat. As Country Officer, I support EITI 
implementation in English and Portuguese speaking Africa, including Mozambique. 
While professional engagement in the EITI has been valuable for deepening my 
understanding of the process, it also poses a certain challenge to my neutrality as a 
researcher studying the EITI. I have made conscious efforts to keep my role as a 
researcher and as an EITI employee apart from each other, although this separation of 
course cannot be completely achieved. The data for this study were collected prior to 
my employment at the EITI, and I have not used any data accessible only to EITI staff 
for this study. 
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4 Setting the global mechanism in Mozambique’s context 
4.1 The EITI Principles and requirements 
The EITI is a global coalition of governments, civil society and companies that 
maintains the EITI Standard. It claims to provide a tool for the better governance of the 
oil, gas and mining sectors. The EITI Standard consists of a set of requirements 
regarding the disclosure of information about the extractive sector and the steering of 
the multi-stakeholder process on country level. Countries first become EITI candidates 
by taking four initial steps, and once all requirements are met, they are declared EITI 
compliant. On the global level, the process is steered by the multi-stakeholder EITI 
Board. The EITI is a voluntary governance mechanism for countries, but once a 
government decides to implement the EITI, all companies operating in that country are 
required to disclose information, whether supportive or the EITI or not (EITI, 2013). 
 
Table 1. The EITI process on country level. 
1. The country completes four sign-up steps to become a candidate: 
a. A public statement by the government on their intention to implement 
the EITI. 
b. Appointment of a senior government official to lead the process 
c. The government engages with civil society and companies to form a 
multi-stakeholder group (MSG), which steers the EITI process. 
d. The multi-stakeholder group agrees on a workplan, which reflects the 
EITI Principles and national priorities. 
2. Annual publication of EITI reports, in line with the requirements and the 
scope agreed by the MSG. 
3. The MSG communicates the findings of the reports to create public debate 
and ensures recommendations from the reports lead to improvements.  
4. Validation determines whether EITI requirements are met. 
Source: Adapted from the EITI Standard 2013. 
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The history of the EITI explains why a multi-stakeholder solution was found most 
appropriate to the given challenge – namely poor governance of extractive resources. 
Pressure from global civil society following the report A Crude Awakening led the 
petroleum company BP to publish a signature bonus it had paid to the Angolan 
government. As a result, the Angolan government threatened to expel the company, 
which was a backlash to the demands for wider disclosure of payments. Companies 
were unwilling to disclose information if it put them in a disadvantageous position in 
relation to other companies. The UK Government, communicating with both the oil 
industry and the Publish What You Pay campaign, assumed a leading role in creating 
the EITI, a solution which would increase transparency while having equal requirements 
for all companies operating in a country. (EITI, 2014c.)  
In 2003, the twelve EITI Principles were approved by the three stakeholder groups. 
Over the years the EITI’s disclosure requirements have evolved, but the principles have 
remained intact. In short, the principles determine that natural resources should benefit 
citizens, transparency is useful for achieving this goal, and all stakeholders have a role 
in seeking solutions. State sovereignty, accountability and rule of law are underlying 
ideals. 
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Table 2. EITI Principles. 
1. We share a belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should be 
an important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to 
sustainable development and poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, 
can create negative economic and social impacts. 
2. We affirm that management of natural resource wealth for the benefit of a 
country’s citizens is in the domain of sovereign governments to be exercised 
in the interests of their national development. 
3. We recognise that the benefits of resource extraction occur as revenue 
streams over many years and can be highly price dependent. 
4. We recognise that a public understanding of government revenues and 
expenditure over time could help public debate and inform choice of 
appropriate and realistic options for sustainable development.  
5. We underline the importance of transparency by governments and companies 
in the extractive industries and the need to enhance public financial 
management and accountability. 
6. We recognise that achievement of greater transparency must be set in the 
context of respect for contracts and laws.  
7. We recognise the enhanced environment for domestic and foreign direct 
investment that financial transparency may bring.  
8. We believe in the principle and practice of accountability by government to 
all citizens for the stewardship of revenue streams and public expenditure.  
9. We are committed to encouraging high standards of transparency and 
accountability in public life, government operations and in business.  
10. We believe that a broadly consistent and workable approach to the disclosure 
of payments and revenues is required, which is simple to undertake and to 
use. 
11. We believe that payments’ disclosure in a given country should involve all 
extractive industry companies operating in that country. 
12. In seeking solutions, we believe that all stakeholders have important and 
relevant contributions to make – including governments and their agencies, 
extractive industry companies, service companies, multilateral organisations, 
financial organisations, investors and non-governmental organisations. 
Source: EITI Standard 2013, p.9. 
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The interviews for this study were conducted in late 2012 and early 2013, when the 
prevailing EITI requirements were defined in the EITI Rules 2011 edition, the 
predecessor of the EITI Standard. At that time, there were 20 requirements that guided 
the governance of the EITI and disclosure and dissemination of information. The core is 
formed by two central elements: the multi-stakeholder group that steers EITI 
implementation and disclosure of payments made by companies and of revenue 
received by the government. What the companies report they have paid is compared to 
what the government reports it has received. This reconciliation is conducted by an 
independent firm that produces an EITI report that contains the reported amounts and 
any discrepancies found. The government is required to ensure that civil society and oil, 
gas and mining companies are fully engaged in the EITI process. It is also the 
government’s responsibility to ensure that all relevant companies and government 
agencies disclose required appropriately audited information (EITI, 2011, p.14.)  
Since the interviews were conducted, the scope of the EITI has expanded and 
requirements have become more specific. In May 2013, the EITI Rules dating from 
2011 were replaced by the EITI Standard. The standard requires disclosure beyond the 
reconciliation of payments made by companies and revenue received by governments. 
EITI countries are required to publish annual reports that contain information or links to 
information on licenses and their allocation, production and export data, the size of the 
extractive industries and their importance for the economy, the role of and expenditures 
by state-owned enterprises, sub-national payments and transfers, and social projects. 
The EITI reports should increase public understanding of the extractive industries’ 
value chain. The EITI is a government-led process, in which the government engages 
with civil society and industry to form a national multi-stakeholder group. (EITI, 2013.) 
There are no mechanisms of coercion to ensure the government’s commitment to the 
EITI, except the possibility of delisting from the EITI by the international board. Once a 
country implements the EITI, all companies, whether supportive or not, must disclose 
required information. (EITI, 2013.) In Mozambique, regulation of the mining law 
(28/2003) enables the state to fine companies that do not disclose the required 
information. 
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The EITI is an example of new governance forms, which bring states, companies and 
civil society to the same table. All three parties participate in decision-making on both 
global and national level, although the state’s voluntary commitment to the standard is a 
precondition. A political rationality that involves and legitimises demands for 
transparency affects the strategies of states and their possibilities of action.  
4.2 Views on the EITI’s limits 
The EITI has gained widespread international support from companies, NGOs and 
governments. The G8 and G20 groups have on several occasions affirmed their support 
to the initiative. The World Bank has had a central role in supporting the EITI. It 
provides technical and financial assistance to EITI implementing countries through the 
EITI Multi-Donor Trust Fund (World Bank, 2014).  The number of EITI compliant 
countries increased from one to 27 between 2009 and 2014. New industrialised 
countries, such as the United Kingdom have taken op the EITI process themselves.  The 
EITI reports now cover over USD 1300 billion of government revenues. (EITI, 2014a.) 
The critique EITI faces from scholars is two-pronged. Some criticize the standard for 
being overly optimistic about results (e.g. Kolstad & Wiig, 2009; Kolstad & Soreide, 
2009), while others criticize the neoliberal logic behind the EITI (e.g. Bracking, 2009). 
Some scholars doubt the might of transparency without questioning the importance o 
good governance more widely. The importance of tackling corruption to maximise 
benefits from natural resources has academic support. However, scholars disagree on 
whether the EITI can be useful in this sense.  Kolstad and Soreide (2009) consider 
corruption the main reason why resources do not promote economic development in 
resource-rich countries. However, according to Kolstad and Soreide (2009) and Kolstad 
and Wiig (2009) the EITI focuses too much on how much is paid and received and too 
little on how the revenues are used. Transparency in itself does not automatically 
translate into less corruption. More attention should be paid to the mechanisms how 
transparency can lead to more accountability. (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009.)  
Results of studies analysing the link between EITI implementation and corruption have 
been diverse. Ölcer (2009) notes that indices measuring corruption show that resource-
rich countries that implement the EITI actually have higher levels of perceived 
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corruption
1
 and calls for embedding the EITI in a wider reform process. David-Barretts 
and Okamura’s (2013) recent findings contradict this by showing that EITI 
implementation has on average improved countries’ performance on the Corruption 
Perceptions Index. Etter (2014) shows in his case study on Peru and Mali that EITI’s 
impact on corruption depends on the level of civil society participation and varies from 
country to country. Meissner (2013) has studied the EITI in Azerbaijan and concludes 
that EITI does not lead to a rapid change in governance and that transparency should be 
extended from revenues to government expenditure to have an impact on corruption. 
The EITI itself also acknowledges the challenges of transforming transparency into 
accountability and prudent governance of resources. Now that more than five years have 
passed since Azerbaijan became the first EITI compliant country in 2009 (EITI, 2014c), 
the focus is shifting from consolidating the initiative to analysing its practical 
consequences. In the foreword of the EITI Standard, Chair Clare Short notes that in 
order to achieve better governance, wider reform efforts a required, and transparency is 
not sufficient on its own (EITI, 2013). 
Mozambican researchers have doubted the effectiveness of the EITI in the 
Mozambique, but focus has been on the scope, rather than the foundations or structure 
of the initiative. Ossemane (2012) notes that disclosing and reconciling payments and 
revenue does not reveal or prevent mismanagement or misuse of funds at other stages of 
the value chain. Excessively generous fiscal regimes or contracts disadvantageous to the 
state, misrepresentation of costs by companies and the misuse of public funds are issues 
that the EITI does not capture. The EITI Standard (2013) requires additional disclosures 
on the volume and value of production and social projects, but contract transparency 
remains a ‘recommended’ feature and use of funds can only be followed as long as they 
are earmarked. 
Another line of critique views the global anti-corruption regime from which the EITI 
stems as embedded in a wider neoliberal agenda. Sarah Bracking (2009) criticizes the 
EITI for being part of a regime, which shifts responsibility from companies to 
                                                 
1
 Thompson and Shah (2005) have noted that transparency can lead to the perception that corruption has 
increased, as cases of corruption are brought to daylight. This can lead to a deteriorating score on the 
Corruption Perceptions Index. 
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developing country governments. According to Bracking (2009, p.2), “EITI furthers the 
pathologising agenda of governance transcripts in the South, which denies and mystifies 
Northern global agency and excessive profit extraction”. EITI thus serves to create a 
misleading assumption that a win/win situation in extractive industries is possible. 
Correspondingly, Hilson and Maconachie (2008) also consider that the EITI places too 
much responsibility for corruption on governments and too little on companies. 
Hilson and Maconachie (2008) note that donors tend to blame Sub-Saharan African 
governments for their claimed poor performance in managing extractive resources and 
revenue deriving from them, instead of placing responsibility on western companies. 
This aspect is relevant for considering the responsibilities built into the EITI. Hilson and 
Maconachie (2008) argue that the EITI continues this line of thinking by placing 
emphasis on the mismanagement of revenue. On the other hand, one may argue that 
equal importance is given to the amounts paid, which reflect not only the government’s 
ability to create an appropriate fiscal framework, but also the level of companies’ 
compliance with contracts and legislation. The constant redefinition of the causes of the 
problems and the responsibilities for solving them plays an important part in 
governance and shaping technologies of governing. 
Gathii (2000) argues that the good governance discourse is misleading and paradoxical. 
It claims to empower the poor but continues to protect the powerful. Citizens are ‘freed’ 
from the arbitrary actions of corrupt governments and placed under the realm of ‘free 
markets’, which according to Gathii limit their possibilities alike.  Although Gathii’s 
critique is not aimed particularly at the EITI, it shares with Bracking’s views the 
critique towards misleading neoliberal discursive and political practises that serve to 
hide unequal power relations. After all, “a society without power relations can only be 
an abstraction” (Foucault, 1982, p. 791). Gathii’s argument illustrates how governance 
technologies shape the possibilities and expectations of actors. 
4.3 Extractive industries and the EITI in Mozambique 
In order to understand the governance of the extractive sector in current Mozambique, it 
is necessary to look back into the country’s history. Mozambique gained its 
independence from Portugal in 1975, after 11 years of armed struggle. The Portuguese 
left behind a largely uneducated population and infrastructure devastated by war. 
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(Gqada, 2013.) The newly independent country with a Marxist-oriented leadership did 
not get a chance to develop in peace, as a bloody civil war soon broke out in 1977. The 
ruling party Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique), which had lead the fight 
against the Portuguese, was confronted by Renamo, a guerrilla movement supported by 
the South African apartheid leadership. (Funada-Classen, 2012.) The war that claimed 
nearly a million lives came to an end in 1992, when President Joaquim Chissano and 
Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama signed a peace accord (White, 2011).  
As the Cold War had ended in the defeat of the Socialist block, Mozambique shifted 
from Marxism to market liberalism with the support of international financial 
institutions. The first democratic elections were held in 1994, and Frelimo has remained 
the ruling party throughout Mozambique’s independence (Funada-Classen, 2012, p.14). 
In the October 2014 elections Frelimo lost nearly 50 seats in the parliament for the first 
time since independence, although it continues to hold on to a majority. Dhlakama, who 
still leads Renamo, has claimed that the elections were fraudulent. (Reuters, 2014.) A 
new opposition party MDM (Movimento Democrático de Moçambique) has stepped in 
but its support is still relatively low (Jackson, 2013). It has been claimed that Frelimo 
uses the state to further the interests of the party, and that control of both the state and 
the party is highly centralised around Frelimo leaders. This has led to the 
ineffectiveness of formal institutional checks and balances. (ILPI, 2013.) 
In recent years, large deposits of mineral resources have been discovered in 
Mozambique. Planned and on-going projects in the extractive sector are constantly 
present in the local media. They are transforming the economy of the country which has 
until now exported mostly prawns, cashews and cotton (CIA World Factbook, 2014). 
Multinational mining, gas and oil companies are investing billions of dollars in 
Mozambique, although many projects are still in exploration stage. Under 
Mozambique’s surface lies a variety of fossil fuels, gems and metals. Mozambique 
hosts reserves of coal and natural gas that could make it one of the largest producers of 
these commodities in the world. (EITI Mozambique, 2014a.) For decades, conflict 
prevented exploration for mineral resources. Political stability and high commodity 
prices have motivated prospection, although prices have come down since the peak in 
2011. Coal mining projects in the province of Tete are already exporting but it will take 
years before first liquefied natural gas (LNG) will be exported. (EITI Mozambique, 
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2014a.) There is no exact information on the size or quality of the reserves of mineral 
resources. Proven reserves of natural gas amount to 127 billion cubic meters (January 
2013) (CIA World Factbook, 2014), and yet more gas may be undiscovered (ICF 
International, 2012). Coal reserves are estimated at more than 20 billion tonnes 
(AllAfrica, 2013).  
The majority of the mineral resources are located in the northern parts of the country, in 
the provinces of Tete, Cabo Delgado and Niassa (EITI Mozambique, 2014a). The 
leaders of Mozambique have traditionally come from the south, and the capital Maputo 
is located at the southernmost end of the country, thousands of kilometres away from 
the coal mines of Tete or the natural gas of the Rovuma basin. The resource wealth of 
the north has begun to shift the political power balance of the country. The ruling party 
Frelimo held its 2012 Party Congress in the northern city of Pemba, the capital of Cabo 
Delgado (Hanlon, 2012). The governor of Tete was made prime minister in a reshuffle 
of ministers by then president Armando Guebuza in November 2012 (Reuters, 2012). 
Frelimo candidates for the presidential elections in 2014 were partly assessed by their 
origin. At the end, a northerner, Felipe Nyusi, was selected as the Frelimo candidate and 
was elected president in October 2014. (Deutsche Welle, 2014.) 
Frelimo leaders have tight connections to business circles (ILPI, 2013). Former 
president Guebuza (2005-2014) was known to have personal business interests and 
carries the nickname “Guebusiness”.  His extended family is involved in practically 
every sector of the economy, including mining. (Nhacote, 2012.) The political and 
business elite are taking advantage of local content requirements by securing service-
providing contracts with extractive companies. As many politicians and their families 
have shares in the companies that provide services, this is a lucrative way to maximise 
personal gain without visible corruption. Guebuza has had few challengers within 
Frelimo and the party insiders have a tight grip of the state apparatus. (ILPI, 2013.) This 
situation of ‘state capture’ affects distribution of benefits from the extractive industries, 
as well as the business environment. Mozambique’s rank in the Doing Business 
indicator has fallen in the past years. Especially starting a business has become more 
difficult. (World Bank Group, 2014.) 
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Mozambique is one of the world’s least developed countries when viewed through the 
UN Human Development Index. In the index that takes into account indicators 
describing the levels of health, education and living standards, Mozambique ranks at 
178th out of 187 countries (UNDP, 2014b). Economic growth is however rapid with 
GDP growing at an average rate of 7.3% per annum between 2006 and 2012 (KPMG, 
2013). Of the Mozambican population of 23 million, 75 per cent depend on agriculture 
for their living (FAO, 2014). Mozambique is a rural economy and land is essential for 
the income of its inhabitants.  
The land legislation was reformed in 1997, and the process was praised as successful.  
All land is owned is by the state, but individuals and communities can gain a title 
document to the land they occupy or rent it. (Hanlon, 2004.) Foreign investors can 
obtain a 50 year right to use the land (DUAT), which can be renewed for another 50 
years. According to the Land Law, one’s right to use land may be repealed if public 
interest so requires and a just payment is made. (§18.1.b, Land Law, 19/97.) In 2012, a 
new decree was passed regulating the relocation of population due to economic 
activities (Ministerial decree 31/2012). The resettlement of local communities by 
mining giants Vale and Rio Tinto in the province of Tete has caused significant 
disputes. The relocated communities have been unsatisfied with the resettlement 
location, as well as with the dwellings. Protests have occurred, and in December 2011, a 
group of local activists/residents blocked a Vale coal train. (Human Rights Watch, 
2013). The Vale coal mine is one of the few extractive sector projects in Mozambique 
that are already in production stage. The displacement of population out of the way of a 
gas liquefaction plant in Cabo Delgado has also caused dispute (Fauvet, 2013). 
Mozambique revised both its mining and petroleum legislation in 2014. In total six laws 
governing the sector were passed within a year. The Centre for Public Intergrity, a vocal 
Maputo-based CSO that is also represented in the EITI multi-stakeholder group, has 
criticised the legal reforms for lack of transparency. (CIP, 2014.) Development partners, 
such as Germany, the UK and the World Bank have encouraged strengthening the legal 
framework for extractives and Norway’s Oil for Development programme has been 
especially active in providing support to legal reforms in the petroleum sector (Norad, 
2014).  
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In the 2013 Resource Governance Index, Mozambique rates as “failing” at position 46 
out of 58 countries. The index measures the comprehensiveness of the institutional and 
legal setting, reporting practices, safeguards and quality controls and the enabling wider 
governance environment. The highest score (58/100) is in fact gained from the legal and 
institutional setting, while Mozambique’s lowest score (26/100) is on reporting 
practices, a component that should improve with the adoption of the EITI Standard, 
which requires disclosure of many of the measured elements. (Revenue Watch Institute, 
2013.) 
Increase in the number of so called megaprojects and large-scale foreign investments 
has caused concern among Mozambican civil society and media. Among the first large 
scale foreign investments was the Mozal aluminium smelter, built in the 1990’s by the 
South African border. Mosca & Selemane (2012) criticize the government of 
Mozambique for taking the side of multinational companies in conflict situations. They 
are also concerned about the close ties between companies and the government, both on 
national and provincial levels.  Megaprojects are often related to land investments and 
natural resource extraction. Mozambican small producers and national industries are, 
according to them, excluded from the process (Mosca & Selemane, 2012).  
As revenues from the extractive sector remain low, Mozambique continues to be highly 
aid dependant. In 2013, Mozambique expected 34.9% of the state budget to be financed 
by development aid (GoM, 2013). The figure remains high, although it is remarkably 
down from 51.4 per cent in 2010 (AllAfrica, 2012.)  Aid dependency has an influence 
on the dynamics of Mozambican politics and policies. Mozambique became a “donor 
darling” country after the civil war, as it adapted market-friendly policies recommended 
by international financial institutions, shifted towards liberal democracy and welcomed 
foreign investments. (Renzio & Hanlon, 2007.) 
Mozambique became an EITI candidate country in 2009 and published its first EITI 
report in 2011, covering the fiscal year 2008. Later in 2011, the EITI Board renewed 
Mozambique’s candidate status declaring that Mozambique had made meaningful 
progress in implementing the standard but did not yet meet all requirements of the EITI 
Rules 2011. In October 2012, Mozambique was declared a compliant country after it 
had undertaken corrective measures that were considered sufficient by the EITI Board.  
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To date, Mozambique has produced four reports under the EITI Rules, and one report 
under the EITI Standard, published on 31 December 2014. (EITI, 2014c.) 
Revenue from the extractive sector increased between 2008 and 2011, along with the 
number of companies reporting. Input into the state budget remains small: in 2009 the 
reported revenues of US $40 million constituted less than three per cent of the state’s 
total tax revenues. (Ossemane, 2012.) Revenue in 2011 reached roughly US $112 
million, with gas companies contributing more than mining. Despite the increase from 
2009, extractives revenue continued to represent roughly three percent of total 
government revenue in 2011, as other tax revenue had also increased (EITI 
Mozambique, 2014b). Two companies were ordered to pay a fine equivalent to 2240€ 
for failing to disclose information on their payments to the government for the 2010 
report. Civil society has criticized that the fines were too small to affect large 
companies. (Observatorio Moçambicano da Governaçâo, 2013.) The discrepancies 
found between the revenues reported by the government and payments reported by the 
companies, have been small: less than one per cent in 2011. (EITI, 2014c.)  
The Mozambican EITI multi-stakeholder group is called the Coordinating Committee 
(Comitê de Coordenação). The group consists of 16 members, four from each 
stakeholder group.  At the time of my data collection, the government was represented 
by officials from the Ministry of Mineral Resources (MIREM), the Ministry of Planning 
and Development, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Environment. The 
President of the Committee was the Vice-minister of Mineral Resources and the 
committee representative from MIREM is also the coordinator of the group. Private 
companies have organised into interest groups according to commodity sectors. Oil and 
gas companies and mining companies have two seats each. Petroleum producers are 
organised under AMOPI and mining companies under the Chamber of Mines and the 
Mozambican Association for Coal Development (AMDCM). Private sector members of 
the committee represent their respective groups. Civil society has four seats alike, with 
one reserved for the media and one for the academia. (Adam Smith International, 2011.) 
Daily activities are run by the national secretariat of EITI Mozambique, an agency 
funded partly by the government and partly by the World Bank (EITI Mozambique, 
2013). 
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The political, economic and historical contexts of Mozambique, together with the 
transnational influences promoting ‘good governance’ affect the mechanisms of 
governing Mozambique’s extractive sector. The strong position of the Frelimo party, 
dependence on development aid and conflicts between local communities and extractive 
companies are factors that shape how mineral resources are governed in Mozambique. 
The form the EITI has in Mozambique and different actors’ perceptions of EITI 
Mozambique’s function both reflect actors’ understandings of extractive sector 
governance and shape them. This nexus will be explored further in the following 
sections. 
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5 Rendering mineral resources governable through the EITI 
5.1 Neoliberal rationality and techniques of governance within EITI Mozambique  
This chapter sets the basis for analysing and understanding stakeholder views of EITI 
Mozambique through the concept of political rationality, building on the remarks made 
in previous chapters about the political agendas and practices involved in the EITI and 
the Mozambican political economy. The EITI is analysed as a technology of 
governance, which is the embodiment of a political rationality, a discursive field 
containing ideas of how things ought to be (Rose & Miller, 1992). The way the EITI 
brings private and non-governmental actors into decision-making processes is justified 
by neoliberal arguments to improve the investment climate and increase competition in 
markets (Ferguson, 2010). Interviews conducted for this study in Mozambique however 
show that actors formulate diverse programmes and often use the conventional political 
rationalities to advance their goals. The new forms of governance are intertwined with 
the state-dominated ways of decision-making and the neoliberal political rationality 
underpinning the EITI is complemented by other rationalities (Collier, 2009). 
Neoliberal political rationality is useful for understanding the discourse related to EITI, 
although the form the EITI actually takes in a specific context, such as Mozambique, 
resembles a variety of rationalities and programmes. My own interview data show that 
in EITI Mozambique neoliberal techniques of governing are mixed with other 
techniques and understandings of governance, and rhetorical techniques drawing from 
neoliberal governance are applied to further other agendas. Neoliberal political 
rationality alone does not therefore explain the agenda to implement the EITI in 
Mozambique, nor the practical forms the initiative takes. 
The EITI Principles provide a backdrop for analysing to which extent the views of 
Mozambican stakeholders reflect this rationality. The principles formulate a problem –
natural resource management not leading to sustainable economic growth - and a 
solution – multi-stakeholder governance built on the liberal democratic values of 
participation, public information, accountability, equal treatment and respect of 
contracts. The formulation of these values and their adoption and use in the 
Mozambican context are processes in which power is embodied. The structure of 
knowledge legitimising the EITI globally was widely acknowledged among the 
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interviewed stakeholders, whose statements were supportive of the initiative. The short-
comings informants recognised were related to the EITI’s scope, rather than to its 
philosophy.  
A striking feature in the data collected for this study is that all the informants had a 
positive stance towards the EITI. There were however different views on what 
complying with the EITI requirements actually implied, what kind of impact the EITI 
would have in practice and what kind of change in governance EITI actually implied. 
The informants had different ideas about the scope of EITI Mozambique and the 
benefits it would bring, but at least in an interview situation, the informants 
unanimously supported transparency and the EITI. As a civil society informant (CSO 
A) noted: “There is no doubt that the initiative is very helpful. It’s naturally the next 
step that is more difficult”.  
Statements stemming from a neoliberal political rationality were present in the views of 
all stakeholder groups. Commonly used concepts included transparency, accountability, 
right to information, respect of contracts, dialogue, cooperation, investment climate and 
shared responsibility. The idea of informed public dialogue, the EITI’s essential link 
between transparency and accountability, was widely supported by all stakeholder 
groups. However, different stakeholder groups stressed different aspects.  
Government informants highlighted the EITI’s positive impact on an improved 
investment climate and some informants mentioned closing the space for corruption. 
Several government representatives noted that everyone would benefit from the EITI 
and highlighted cooperation, consensus-building and dialogue as EITI’s positive 
aspects. Although government representatives endorsed liberal attributes such as 
transparency and accountability, they tended to stress that these elements predated the 
EITI in Mozambican politics. All the informants agreed that Mozambique has 
challenges in governing its extractive industries, although government informants were 
more likely to state that the government has mechanisms of regulation and that 
development of the sector is under control. Government informants presented 
Mozambique as a liberal state, thus defending state-centred governance while accepting 
some aspects of neoliberal governance. 
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Civil society informants linked liberal democratic values such as access to information 
and accountability to the EITI. Unlike the government, they did not consider the 
government transparent or accountable, nor did they see the EITI as bringing a radical 
change to the existing situation. Lack of accountability and rent-seeking behaviour 
within the government were considered prevailing problems, and civil society 
informants wished for more space for civil society to participate in decision-making. 
Weak institutions were commonly considered as the cause many problems. As a civil 
society informant (CSO D) noted: “Because of our institutional fragility, as a state, we 
create space for people to seize the opportunity. This is why we have corruption” 
(translated by the author). The idea of strengthening institutions in order to prevent 
corruption is in line with the ‘good governance’ discourse and demonstrates how civil 
society actors had adopted its language (Weiss, 2000). 
Liberal democratic elements such as transparency, accountability, and citizen 
participation were considered important for governing the extractive sector. A civil 
society informant (CSO C) noted very much in line with the spirit of the EITI Principles 
that “transparency leads to accountability. If all people don’t engage in the discussions 
about these issues, this boom is going to be useful for a small percentage of the people, 
mainly the political and economic elite.” Civil society informants seemed to perceive 
neoliberal governance as a technique to have more influence over the government and 
on the governance of the extractive sector.  
Company representatives focused more than civil society on respect of contracts and 
promotion of cooperation. They were very supportive of transparency, dialogue and 
increased information. Especially representatives of European and North American 
companies stated they were willing to disclose further information, such as contracts 
with the government. Mozambican representatives of non-western mining companies 
tended to promote a more gradual approach. All the companies recognised that they had 
responsibilities and all of them supported the idea that natural resources should benefit 
local citizens. They however assigned the leading responsibility for creating sustainable 
development to the government, which could reach this goal through improved 
governance. The company informants had adopted features of neoliberal governance 
that supported their goal of profit maximisation, while accepting increased requirements 
to ‘act responsibly’. Transparency was accepted as a requirement especially by 
50 
 
European and North American informants, but creating an enabling environment for the 
companies’ operations was considered to be responsibility of the state. 
Donor informants saw the EITI as part of their wider efforts to establish ‘good 
governance’ in Mozambique. They were concerned about corruption, patronage and 
weak government capacity to negotiate, plan and monitor the extractive industries. 
These issues were thought to affect the government’s ability to create benefits from the 
mineral resources and distribute them fairly to the population.  
Increasing transparency wass not necessarily the priority that drove all the stakeholders 
to participate in the EITI. The government’s decision to implement the EITI in 
Mozambique may have originated from an understanding that multi-stakeholder 
governance and transparency would help produce desired development results. 
However, the government may also have had other reasons for implementing the EITI. 
The adoption of a mechanism built upon a neoliberal rationality may be seen as a way 
to gain international and domestic recognition from parties that support the underlying 
rationality. Several civil society interviewees doubted whether the government’s 
commitment to promote transparency was actually genuine or merely a political 
strategy.  
Some civil society, donor and company informants noted that there was a significant 
gap between the government’s policies and and their implementation. Especially donor 
and civil society informants argued that the government did not put its progressive 
policies and development programmes into practice and that the stated priorities were 
not translated into action. A company informant noted that laws governing the mineral 
sector were often revised without considering how they would be implemented. The 
lack of political practices that would enable reaching the goals defined in formal 
policies indicates that policies may be used as a rhetorical technique of governance with 
actual objectives differ from the stated ones. 
Different stakeholder groups had different goals to achieve by participating in the EITI. 
Neoliberal techniques of governing were adopted by stakeholders to further objectives 
that did not necessarily originate from the neoliberal political rationality. All the 
informants seemed to share the belief that transparency is a legitimate claim. The EITI 
provides an arena, where demands for transparency are legitimated and institutionalised. 
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Transparency is a part of the matrix of values of neoliberal rationality and a mechanism 
towards what ought to be, towards a goal, which however seems to differ from actor to 
actor. Actors involved in EITI Mozambique referred to the moral idea of transparency 
as a technique to further their own agendas.  
The EITI global rules and requirements, as well as the national EITI workplan set 
frames for a process were different strategies compete or complement each other. The 
prevailing discourse and ‘rational’ scope of action influence the demands of actors but 
what is ‘rational’ and legitimate is also constantly redefined. The combination of pre-set 
global rules and the national definition of the process and its scope makes EITI 
Mozambique a crossing-point of several programmes of governance. EITI Mozambique 
represents the materialisation of a global problematisation: the weak governance of oil, 
gas and mining sectors. As one donor informant (DEV B) put it: “EITI put extractive 
industries on the agenda”. From this perspective, even if the EITI is not seen as a 
solution to Mozambique’s governance challenges, its adoption in Mozambique indicates 
the idea that weak governance is a problem to be corrected. Different actors provided 
different ‘solutions’ to the problem. 
My interviews showed that although neoliberal ideas were reflected in the informants’ 
views, different stakeholder groups emphasized different aspects. Neoliberal 
governmental techniques are adopted selectively and mixed with other techniques of 
governance. Adoption of the neoliberal political rationality does not alone credibly 
explain why Mozambique implements the EITI. The general objective of the EITI –
ensuring that citizens benefit from natural resources– was widely accepted but different 
sectors had different views about the meaning of the objective and how to achieve it. 
The next section analyses the competing understandings of the scope and role of the 
EITI in the governance of extractive industries. 
5.2 How to understand the extractive sector: What is the EITI for? 
The EITI involves a process of shaping the understanding of the nature of the extractive 
sector and how it should be governed. The EITI as a global governance mechanism 
largely stems from neoliberal ideas of governance. These ideas materialise in the EITI 
Principles, and the EITI Standard defines the minimum requirements for compliance.. 
From my interviews it became clear that actors considered important what kind of 
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information about the extractive sector is produced, how it is interpreted and how it is 
disseminated. Political rationalities are translated into governance practices through 
knowledge/power relations. Knowledge, through building mentalities, deems certain 
actions ‘rational’ in a way that what we collectively ‘know’, defines what we think we 
should do. (Rose & Miller, 1992.)  
Two kinds of knowledge-related struggles came out especially strongly in my 
interviews. The first one was related to the scope of the EITI and the debate of what 
should take place within the EITI framework. The second one was related to the 
benefits to be gained from the gas and mining industries. The government and company 
representatives had a strong stance towards using the EITI in order to increase popular 
understanding during the time before revenue would begin to flow in. Different 
stakeholder groups’ positions towards the EITI are summarised in Table 3. 
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The EITI shapes knowledge by producing information. The EITI reports consist of 
figures, accounts and discrepancies between payments and revenue. The information 
included in the reports shifts the spotlight away from what is excluded, and the 
requirements for disclosure construct an understanding of what kind of  information 
should be made public. The EITI does not create a borderless field of deliberation. It 
includes assumptions, values, roles and limits. It sets a certain scope for thinking and 
finding solutions to the problems. For example, environmental issues are beyond the 
scope of the EITI requirements. Although the initiative aims to enhance the governance 
of fossil fuels, it does not cover the impact that burning oil, gas and coal has on the 
climate and indirectly on people’s living conditions in Africa and elsewhere. However, 
the EITI leaves space for national multi-stakeholder groups to include elements going 
beyond the minimum requirements for EITI reports.
2
 For example, EITI in Liberia 
covers forestry and agriculture and publishes production contracts (EITI, 2014a).  
Despite including the definitions of a problem and a solution, the EITI process can be 
expanded significantly beyond the formal requirements if chosen so on a national scale. 
This means the EITI is both a limited and a flexible mechanism of governance, which 
makes it a field of competing techniques of governing. This flexibility leaves room for 
manoeuvre for strategies and techniques of governing to compete within the EITI 
framework. This leads attention to analysing the power relations within multi-
stakeholder governance. 
Different ideas of the desired scope of the EITI in Mozambique reflect the plurality of 
strategies and interests of the different actors involved. They highlight that what is 
understood governable through the EITI is not a neutral technical issue but rather a 
result of competing rationalities and techniques. For interviewed representatives of the 
government, complying with the EITI requirements was considered sufficient. They 
saw no need to involve additional features, such as contract transparency, in the national 
EITI process. They highlighted the need to consolidate the EITI process and proceed 
gradually, although they were open to the idea of expanding the EITI to other sectors, 
including renewable natural resources. Especially government informants viewed 
achieving the status of an EITI compliant country as a goal that had been reached.  
                                                 
2
 It is to be noted that interviews for this study were conducted before the EITI Standard replaced the EITI 
Rules, whose requirements focused mostly on reconciling payments and revenues. 
55 
 
Civil society informants, on the other hand, viewed the EITI as “a good first step” (CSO 
A). The EITI for them and for some donor informants was something that could be 
developed further, a discussion-opener. International examples of including locally 
relevant elements were mentioned by a civil society informant (CSO C) as an 
innovative practice. The displacement of local residents from mining sites is an issue 
that has prompted much public debate in Mozambique, and which some civil society 
and company informants mentioned as a highly challenging issue. A civil society 
informant (CSO F) noted: “Communities are feeling now the pressure of big money 
throwing them off their land.” Despite this, none of the interviewed stakeholders 
suggested to include issues of land governance within the scope of the EITI. 
The challenges faced by Mozambique’s extractive sector were largely considered as 
structural by all stakeholder groups: low capacity of the government, low education of 
the population and lack of infrastructure. These challenges are factors that were 
considered to impede the development of the sector and its economic contribution. 
Issues such as workers’ rights or environmental risks were not commonly mentioned as 
challenges. Informants had differing views on how the extractive industries should be 
governed but they largely agreed that the goal was to ensure that the Mozambican 
people benefitted from the country’s natural resources. This is in line with the first EITI 
Principle, which states that natural resource wealth, if prudently governed, should lead 
to sustainable development and poverty reduction (EITI, 2013). 
Different informants had differing views about how balanced the tripartite EITI 
Coordinating Committee was and about the function of the group. Government 
representatives praised the group for hosting open dialogue among different 
stakeholders. Civil society representatives, on the other hand, were not content with the 
multi-sectorial group and felt that their opinions were not heard. A civil society 
informant (CSO B) stated his frustration about company and government 
representatives teaming up in the committee. Civil society informants felt that they had 
no real opportunity to affect the discussion and decisions. Several of them brought up 
the fact that EITI reports focused too much on what was paid and received, instead of 
on what grounds it was paid, what should have been paid and how the revenues were 
used. Some company representatives openly disagreed with this view. They perceived 
the committee as a forum for discussing only issues directly linked to the 
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implementation of the EITI and complained that civil society actors brought up 
questions that were not “about the EITI” (COM B). These issues were related to 
disclosing information that was not required by the EITI Rules 2011. Interviewed 
company representatives were, however, satisfied with the functioning of the 
committee. 
The struggle to define the scope of EITI Mozambique shows that new governance 
structures are not neutral or free of conflicting strategies. Treating them as such would 
create a false sense of horizontality. Different understandings of the functioning of the 
EITI Coordinating Committee reflect wider societal power relations. The EITI is 
inspired by and built upon a certain political rationality. The empowerment it grants to 
non-state actors is an enactment power when viewed through a governmentality lens 
(Dean, 2010, pp. 21-50). According to Sawyer & Gomez (2008), in countries where 
principles of economic liberalisation have been widely adapted, also indigenous people 
have more channels to influence natural resource management. This empowerment, 
however, often goes hand-in-hand with marginalisation. Sawyer & Gomez (2008) found 
that the socio-economic rights of the local population have been constantly undermined 
by pro-mining interests. This shows that it is necessary to look under the surface when 
attempting to explain and understand novel governance structures.  
A feature of neoliberal political rationality is the ‘responsibilisation’ of citizens 
(Ferguson, 2010). This trend is present in the logic of the EITI. The initiative produces 
public information and then transfers the responsibility to act upon this information to 
citizens. In Mozambique, a country with almost half the population illiterate and with 
limited access to media in rural areas, this idea is challenging. Several informants 
pointed out that the lack of dissemination of information included in EITI reports was a 
central problem of EITI Mozambique. There had been ‘road shows’ in rural areas, 
presenting the findings of the reports and civil society had published material explaining 
the EITI to citizens. These activities were, however, considered as insufficient. 
Different stakeholder groups assigned a different purpose for disseminating 
information. 
Alongside with the debate to define the scope of the EITI, the informants’ views 
reflected attempts to steer the wider discourse on extractive sector governance. Several 
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government and company representatives stressed the importance of disseminating 
‘correct’ information about the sector. The multi-stakeholder group was seen by a 
company informant as a platform where civil society’s flawed perceptions could be 
corrected. Publishing information in EITI reports enabled companies to show that they 
paid taxes, which was considered a major benefit of the EITI by company 
representatives. Managing popular expectations of benefits to be received from the 
extractive industries was in the interest of both the government and companies. 
Company informants wanted to increase understanding of the high risks and costs of the 
industry and show that they paid taxes, recognising that there was more international 
pressure than before to avoid a bad reputation. The government informants, as well as 
many company and donor informants, wanted to communicate to the people that 
benefits from mineral extraction should not be expected quickly. 
It seems that a discursive contest to define the expectations of benefits from the 
extractive industries was taking place. This struggle shared features with the struggle to 
define the scope of the EITI and the limits for legitimate claims within it. They 
demonstrate the importance of setting the discursive field of governance. It is a process 
where what is desirable and what is possible are defined. (Rose & Miller, 1992.) Several 
company and government representatives indicated that people expected to see benefits 
from gas and mining too soon. There is an on-going contest over the public 
understanding of what the benefits are, who they belong to and when they will start 
realising.  
Knowledge produced in the EITI reports can be interpreted in several ways. The amount 
paid by companies to the state can be considered as sufficient or insignificant, 
depending on the point of view. Interpretations depend on the actor’s view on what is an 
appropriate fiscal regime or the amount of taxes extractive companies should pay. These 
ideas are linked to diverse understandings of the role of the state and the private sector 
in governing the extractive sector. The debate over what is the proper amount of 
payments can be considered a manifestation of the strategic games among different 
stakeholders. The discussion about the appropriate level of tax payments, and what is 
left outside the debate, shapes governance. As there is a link between thinking and 
practices of governing, this struggle may have material outcomes (Dean, 2010, pp. 21-
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50). It affects how stakeholders view their own and other’s responsibilities and the 
desired situation.  
The government’s interest in managing the citizens’ expectations shows that the public 
opinion matters to the Frelimo government. A civil society informant (CSO F) noted: 
“You can say that the government is arrogant, the Frelimo do whatever they want to do. 
But the society has reached the point that the government has to defend itself all the 
time, has to justify the actions it takes.” Civil society and donor informants noted that 
there was a growing sense of inequality and injustice within society. Controlling 
expectations about distribution of benefits from the extractive sector plays a part in 
controlling the social discontent.  
A graffiti scribbled on the back of a bus stop in Maputo in early 2013 asked: “Are our 
resources theirs?”  (translated by the author). The graffiti tells something about the 
popular sentiment regarding wealth from natural resources. The EITI (2013) states that 
naturals resources should benefit citizens but especially civil society informants doubted 
that this would happen. Riots in 2008, 2010 and 2012 over the rising cost of living, 
press censorship during the Frelimo National Congress in October 2012 and protests 
against coal mining in Tete showed that Mozambique is not a stable society. A 
prominent economist Carlos Castel-Branco stated that Mozambique is a society ready to 
explode (Barroso, 2012). According to informants, the Government of Mozambique 
was nervous and was not open to critique. 
There was a widely felt sense of growing inequality among the rich political and 
business elite and the people.  As a civil society informant stated (CSO D): “When you 
have a convoy of 15 or 20 Mercedes Benz for a leader and at the same time you have 
thousands of people who cannot go home because there is no public transport, that is an 
indicator that there is more inequality” (translated by the author). The statement reflects 
well the sentiment that was observable in the interviews with many civil society, donor 
and even company informants. This shaped the limits of action of the government, as 
the sense of inequality caused tensions that needed to be managed.  As a civil society 
informant (CSO C) stated: “So the things going that way are going to cause serious 
conflict, the people are going to get poorer than they are now and the political elite and 
their business allies are getting rich.” 
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Several informants referred to the low level of education of the Mozambican 
population. Company and government representatives commonly argued that the 
population lacked understanding of the gas and mining industries and that they should 
be informed about how long it would take to create benefits for the population from 
mining and gas operations. A civil society informant (CSO D) noted that after twenty 
years since the end of the civil war, the population had slowly become more and more 
educated. Discussions were taking place among development partners suggesting that 
the Frelimo government did not wish to see the quality of education develop so that the 
governing party would not be challenged by a more informed and critical population.  
Civil society informants pointed to the same phenomenon. As one of them (CSO A) 
noted: 
“Knowledge and thinking in this country are completely co-opted by the 
political power. The education hardly allows people to think outside the 
paternalist perspective: ‘Frelimo is my father, the government is my father.’ 
Communities in Tete (the coal producing province) conform to whatever the 
government says, even when they are discontent”. 
The EITI expects citizens to participate in public debate about the governance of 
mineral resources and to hold the government accountable. My interviews suggest that 
the government and companies assign a competing function to the EITI: providing 
citizens with information that reduces discontent. Thus the purpose of the information 
published through the EITI seems not to be, according to them, to enable citizens to 
challenge the government and companies, but to assure them that companies do pay 
taxes and that the population will see the benefits if  patient. Thus the government was 
using the EITI as a technique to reduce popular dissent through the governance of social 
expectations. Using the EITI as such a technique of governing shows that the 
government or companies have difficulties in controlling the production or 
dissemination of information regarding the extractive sector. By making information 
available to civil society and the media they can attempt to steer the type of information 
guiding public debate but at the same time they open a window for civil society to 
interpret and use the information in competing ways. 
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Civil society’s dissatisfaction with the scope of information published through the EITI 
is related to their differing understanding of the EITI’s purpose. Information that is not 
made available also shapes knowledge. Civil society informants widely stated that the 
EITI was largely irrelevant in Mozambique because it did not focus on the points of 
corruption or other issues with large societal impact. As a civil society informant (CSO 
F) stated: “I don’t have the right numbers, I don’t have the right information. Because 
these guys know how to work.”  By this statement the informant meant that the 
government intentionally did not provide figures that would address corrupt practices. 
Another CSO informant (CSO D) argued in a similar fashion: “EITI doesn’t address the 
questions people want to know” (translated by the author).  
Civil society informants stressed that the EITI did not provide information that would 
show whether companies had paid what they should have paid. One civil society 
informant noted that the government used the EITI as a distraction. According to this 
informant the government wanted to silence criticism by implementing the EITI, while 
still avoiding disclosing information that could be used against it. Civil society’s 
understanding that the EITI was irrelevant in Mozambique can be traced to the 
government’s unwillingness to make the EITI relevant in order to avoid efforts 
challenging the prevailing techniques of governance. A civil society informant (CSO C) 
stated: “They should make the EITI something that would excite the public”. The 
government’s reluctance to broaden the scope of the EITI indicates that the government 
did not wish the public to get too informed, ‘excited’ or critical. Rather the government 
used EITI as a technique to continue ‘business as usual’ while managing the popular 
dissent.  
The EITI in Mozambique can be considered as both a distraction and a compromise. On 
the one hand, it is a distraction as it enables the government to show that it is committed 
to liberal values, while publishing information that does not endanger the interests of 
the political elite. On the other hand, the implementation of the EITI in Mozambique 
reflects increased international pressure on governments and companies to govern 
natural resources more openly and involve civil society in decision-making. This 
suggests that EITI serves as a compromise between government, company and civil 
society interests.  
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While all informants supported the EITI, different stakeholder groups emphasized 
different aspects of the neoliberal political rationality in their views on the EITI. The 
different emphases reflect how stakeholder groups utilise techniques of neoliberal 
governance selectively to further their agendas. For the government, and to some extent 
for the companies, the purpose of the EITI seems to be to produce information that 
reduces citizens’ discontent. Civil society actors assign a different role to the EITI. They 
saw the EITI as a discussion-opener for more inclusive governance of the extractive 
sector and promoted broadening the scope of EITI reports to cover issues beyond 
international minimum requirements.  
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6 Roles and responsibilities shaped through political rationalities and 
techniques 
6.1 Defending the state while securing an international reputation 
The emergence of multi-stakeholder governance mechanisms entails changes in the 
relations between governments and private and non-governmental actors. In this 
section, I will explore how these changes are reflected in Mozambique’s decision to 
implement the EITI and in the roles and responsibilities actors involved in mineral 
resource governance assign to themselves and others. My interviews show that 
informants representing different stakeholder groups had different ideas about these 
roles and responsibilities. 
The reactions of government representatives to this change in relations between 
different actors show that the form of the change in governance is not uncontested. 
Interviewed representatives of the Mozambican government tended to emphasize the 
role of government institutions in governing the extractive industries at the expense of 
the EITI.  Many of them highlighted the democratic mechanisms of the state when 
asked, whether the agenda of the EITI should be broadened to involve, for example, 
tracking of the use of revenues. This stance enforces a view that governance 
mechanisms within the state apparatus are the ultimate locus of legitimate exercise of 
power. Representatives of the government considered the state as the guardian of the 
interests of the population. 
Several government informants claimed that the EITI did not bring anything new; that 
transparency and institutional procedures to reduce corruption were already in place 
before EITI implementation. State decision-making mechanisms were highlighted by 
government informants especially when answering my questions about the need to 
expand the scope of the EITI. A government informant (GOV A) stressed that the fiscal 
regime was determined in the legislation, which was in the hands of the parliament, 
“where everyone is represented”, and that revenues were directed to the state budget, 
also controlled by the parliament.  
This stance reflects the defence of state-centred decision-making, backed by the 
argument that state institutions represent the interests of the citizens.  Government 
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informants often mentioned national legislation as the mechanism setting the rules for 
resource extraction. As a government informant (GOV D) said: “All the requirements 
for operating in the extractive sector are in the laws” (translated by the author). 
Representatives of government institutions were also more reluctant to give interviews 
about the EITI and were harder to contact than the other informant groups. At times, 
they seemed to be defensive when speaking about extractive sector governance. 
Government informants considered the EITI as an additional element complementing 
state decision-making mechanisms and national legislation, instead of replacing it. Civil 
society informants confirmed that government officials tend to stress the authority of 
the government. One of them (CSO A) argued that although the government had 
entered the EITI, it was unwilling to expand the discussion beyond the minimum 
requirements in order to retain the issues “within the government’s authority”. The EITI 
multi-stakeholder group seems to provide non-state actors a limited channel to influence 
the state governance mechanisms.  
Civil society informants’ views on the state’s internal mechanisms for ensuring 
accountability differed significantly from those of government informants. A civil 
society informant (CSO E) noted that although there is a system of checks and balances 
on paper, this is not creating accountability in practice. According to the informant, the 
National Assembly, for example, acts as little more than a rubber stamp. 
Historically and legally the state has had a strong position in Mozambique. The ruling 
Frelimo party was Marxist-Leninist until resigning from the ideology in 1989 
(Mzumara, 2011). Land and mineral resources in Mozambique are owned by the state 
(§98, Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique, 2004). Local population has 
traditional usufruct rights to land while foreign investors typically use the mechanisms 
of land leasing in order to get access to extractive resources (Land Law, 19/97). 
According to the law, both the interests of citizens and communities and the interests of 
investors are subordinate to the interest of the state. The right of land-use can be 
revoked for reasons of public interest (§18, Land Law, 19/97). The state is also directly 
involved in the extractive sector and the state-owned company ENH takes part in all 
petroleum operations (§24, Petroleum Law, 21/2014).  
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Several informants from the government, companies and civil society argued that 
Mozambique as a country or a nation truly benefits from the EITI. Especially the donor, 
government and company representatives tended to highlight that there were benefits 
for everyone. Here a liberal ideal of consensus, cooperation and mutual benefit 
interestingly merges with a historically socialist project of nation-building and national 
well-being that overrides individual interests. The rhetoric of cooperation serves the 
interests of the ruling party, which has no interest in provoking opposition. 
Interestingly, several informants from both private companies and civil society raised 
questions about how well the government represented the interests of the state. As a 
civil society informant (CSO C) put it: “[Natural] resources belong to the state, not to 
the government”. By this comment, the informant meant that government officials were 
using resources owned by the state and the Mozambican people, for their own purposes.  
Several civil society, company and donor informants openly argued that the Frelimo 
government was using state assets for personal or party purposes. A civil society 
informant also noted that Frelimo had control over the judiciary. According to many 
CSO informants, after nearly four decades under Frelimo’s rule, it had become unclear 
where the line between the political party, the state and the government ran. Informants 
also noted that Frelimo used its heritage as the political party that fought for 
independence to legitimise its rule. Many outside the government doubted the 
government’s representativeness and whether it had the capacity or the willingness to 
fulfil its electoral promises or implement sustainable development policies. Several civil 
society and donor informants noted that civil society and the opposition had less room 
for manoeuvre than before, and that Frelimo had in recent years tightened its grip of the 
state. This distrust towards the ruling party that controlled the state apparatus explains 
civil society and donor support to governance mechanisms that involve participation of 
a wide variety of societal actors. The practices of the Frelimo government seem to be 
out of tune with the prevailing ‘good governance’ paradigm. 
My interviews suggest that the neoliberal political rationality does not alone guide 
governance in Mozambique. Governance includes neopatrimonial elements, such as a 
blurred line between personal and political power and interests (Pitcher et al., 2009). 
Braathen and Orre (2001) describe Mozambique as patrimonial-democratic, a hybrid 
form between patrimonial governance and liberal democratic institutions. Frelimo has 
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control over state assets and different aspects of the state, such as the judiciary, through 
networks of patronage. (Braathen & Orre, 2001). In Mozambique, formal and informal 
modes of authority and rule of law exist side by side. Patrimonial construction of 
legitimacy overlaps with rational-legal legitimacy, on which neoliberal governance 
builds upon. Legitimacy is here approached from a Weberian perspective, asking how 
certain power relations and authorities come to be broadly accepted in a certain setting. 
This perspective on legitimacy fits well together with the analytics of governmentality. 
(Death, 2014, p.14).  
The (neo)liberal political rationality builds legitimacy on transparency, accountability, 
representation and democracy. The government is not measured only against the results 
of the way it governs the extractive sector, it is expected to also allow scrutiny of the 
governance process. This thinking contradicts with patrimonial systems of governing, 
which include a clear definition of those who rule and those who are to be ruled. In 
patrimonial governance, legitimacy is built on reciprocity and a shared understanding of 
roles and responsibilities. (Pitcher, et al. 2009.) The neoliberal rationality provides civil 
society an opportunity to legitimately demand more information and to participate in 
governance mechanisms that were previously the domain of the state.  
The EITI offers civil society actors a mechanism to demand more transparency from the 
government and question the government authorities’ intention when they are not 
willing to disclose information. As a civil society informant (CSO D) stated: 
“The government represents the people. The government signs the contracts in 
the name of the people. So why don’t they show what they are doing in the name 
of the people? The government is there to serve the interest of the people. Not to 
serve their own interests.”  
From interviews with civil society informants it became clear that the EITI is 
considered by them as a compromise because they did not see any alternative 
mechanisms to increase transparency and civil society participation in the governance of 
the extractive sector. As a civil society informant (CSO F) stated, “at least the 
government is doing something”. Several civil society informants mentioned that their 
working environment was difficult and that their space in debates about governance had 
diminished. It was suspected that the discovery of mineral resources had led to Frelimo 
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to further tighten its grip of the state to ensure both personal benefits and political 
stability. Donors largely recognised the same challenges as civil society actors. They 
saw a window of five to ten years when they would still have some influence over the 
government policies until the development aid flows would be replaced with revenues 
from gas and mining sectors. They supported the EITI as a technique of consolidating 
‘good governance’ in Mozambique before the donor influence diminishes.  
Power relations extending across Mozambican borders help to explain why the 
government  chose to implement the EITI, despite the strong constitutional and 
historical role of the state and prevailing elements of patrimonial governance. 
Neoliberal political rationality, including the responsibilisation of private and non-
governmental actors, has spread to Mozambique through governance mechanisms that 
have a supranational reach. EITI implementation is an expression of a change in the 
relations between the state and private and non-governmental actors. The 
problematisation of the role of the state has reached global importance through different 
kinds of transnational networks, flow of information, foreign aid and trade. 
The majority of the informants stated that the government benefitted from the positive 
image it gained in the international arena by implementing the EITI. Mozambique is a 
heavily aid dependent country. Since the end of the civil war and transition into multi-
party democracy and free markets, it has enjoyed the status of a so called donor darling. 
Mozambican policy has shifted from left to right, following the trends of the 
international development community. (Cunguara & Hanlon, 2010.) David-Barrett and 
Okamura (2013) argue that governments suffering from corruption tend to join the EITI 
to build a positive reputation and attract more foreign aid. They find evidence that 
countries indeed receive more development aid if they implement the EITI.  
An informant in the multilateral donor (DEV C) sector formulated the current strategies 
of donors as “push(ing) for transparency, anti-corruption and for strong institutions”. 
Another donor informant (DEV B) confirmed that transparency and accountability had 
been central themes for donors in the past years. These targets are well in line with the 
‘good governance’ discourse promoted by, for example, the World Bank and the EU. 
Complying with the EITI is a very tangible way to show donors commitment to 
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transparency and accountability, which in general are difficult to measure. This was 
recognised as a benefit by both government and donor informants. 
As a civil society informant (CSO B) argued: “The government is very efficient in 
mobilising funds from donors--and specialising in the discourse that pleases the 
donors”. Civil society informants noted that Mozambique has been very active in 
joining international initiatives and committees and attributed this to the government’s 
willingness to maintain a good international reputation. Development partners shared 
the view that the government’s rhetoric was not always in line with its actions. There 
seemed to be a widely held view in the donor sector that the Poverty Reduction Action 
Plan (PARP), which emphasises agricultural development and employment, is merely a 
paper that has not been implemented. According to a donor informant (DEV C), failing 
to meet the EITI requirements at the first evaluation in 2011 was a setback. 
Several civil society informants argued that the government of Mozambique was 
motivated to join the EITI process in order to keep the aid money flowing in. This 
supports David-Barrett’s and Okamura’s (2013) findings. EITI compliance was made 
one of the indicators by which budget support performance was assessed by the G19 
group of donors. Thus there was a clear indication that the donor community would 
view Mozambique’s decision to join the initiative in a positive light and that it might 
affect the donors’ view on how well the country was performing, which might then 
affect future funding.  
Foreign aid can be viewed as a technique of governance, which translates the political 
rationalities of donors to Mozambican society. It is a means by which the conduct of 
recipients is conducted and it includes the production of statistics about poverty, school 
enrolment, maternal deaths and the kind. Development assistance involves ideas about 
how things are, how they should be and how the two are made to meet. (Rose & Miller, 
1992.) The increased emphasis on ‘national ownership’ by developing countries 
represents the responsibilisation of recipient governments, which are expected to ‘own’ 
the development ‘partnership’ with donors. It is executed through techniques of 
governance, such as monitoring, evaluation and performance indicators. (Abrahamsen, 
2004.) After all, ‘development’ is the epitome of governmental thinking, an ultimate 
desirable end that is never completely reached but which is considered possible through 
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correct governance (Rose & Miller, 1992). In this case, neoliberalism can be viewed as 
a political rationality that guides towards new modalities of governance, where the state 
is considered inefficient and insufficient and involving non-state actors brings better 
governance (Ferguson, 2010).  
However, complying with the EITI should not be seen merely as a message towards 
donors. Some donor informants viewed compliance primarily as an attempt to attract 
more foreign investments. This aim was also confirmed by representatives of the 
government. Interviewed private sector representatives, however, did not consider 
compliance with the EITI a significant factor that would influence investment decisions. 
Some did consider it as a sign to investors that Mozambique was now ‘ready to do 
business’, and confirmed that they do take corruption indices into account when making 
an investment decision. Luring investors is in line with the donor interests and views 
about how to achieve development. Bretton Woods institutions are significant 
development agents and also proponents of foreign investments. The World Bank 
Group has a specific organ, called the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, that 
promotes foreign direct investments (FDIs) to developing countries. The World Bank 
Group and the International Monetary Fund are both partner organisations of the EITI, 
and the World Bank administers the Multi-Donor Trust Fund that provides financial 
support to implementing countries (World Bank, 2014). Investor-friendly policies are 
often also donor-friendly policies.  
According to civil society representatives the government had joined the EITI because it 
attracts donors and investors without harming the businesses of the political elite. As 
one civil society informant (CSO B) stated: “The problem is there but EITI does not 
solve the problem so the government officials can say ‘yes’ to EITI and still make 
money with corrupt practices”. According to this informant, the more fine-tuned corrupt 
practices present at the top level in Mozambique include holding companies under the 
ownership of the political elite and granting tax holidays to companies in return for 
shares and board seats. These practices are not visible to the EITI reporting 
mechanisms. Several other informants, mainly donors and civil society representatives, 
also brought up the patronage and rent-seeking patterns present in Mozambican politics. 
The business elite were largely considered identical to the political elite within the 
Frelimo government. This finding is in line with Etter’s (2014) results of the EITI in 
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Azerbaijan. According to Etter, the political elite supported the EITI because it did not 
prevent them from continuing with corrupt practices.  
The EITI Rules 2011, which were in force when I conducted the interviews for this 
research, focused on reconciling payments made by companies and revenues received 
by the government. Payments made by the companies not reaching the state accounts 
were not considered a problem by the informants. Thus complying with the EITI 
requirements did not necessarily collide with the interests of the political elite or limit 
their actions in a significant way. On the contrary, a civil society informant noted that 
the EITI helped attract investors, with whom the political elite could then ally with to 
earn more. As another civil society informant (CSO C) argued: “There is a huge, 
growing problem of conflict of interest in the government. Most of them [government 
authorities] are now involved in extractive industries so there is no transparency”. By 
this the informant emphasised the shares leading politicians and their family members 
hold in mining companies and service providing companies. 
Civil society informants also pointed out that the government was often more interested 
in the opinions of donors and investors than those of local civil society. They however 
considered it positive that donors incentivised the government to adopt the EITI. 
Donors, civil society actors and some company representatives found a common ground 
in promoting transparency. However, the civil society informants considered it 
problematic that the government felt more pressure to demonstrate accountability to 
foreign donors than to its own citizens. As a civil society informant (CSO B) argued: 
“Donors should try to help transfer some of their power to civil society”. Quite 
understandably several civil society informants wished development partners to direct 
more funding to the civil society. However, the alliance between development partners 
and Mozambican civil society seemed to strengthen civil society’s position in relation to 
the government on issues on which donors and CSOs had similar agendas. 
Building on a development paradigm that grants civil society and the private sector the 
right and responsibility to participate in development, donors both finance CSOs and 
promote governance mechanisms allowing civil society’s participation. This is 
beneficial for donors, as the policies they promote gain legitimacy if they are in line 
with local civil society’s agenda. Civil society informants recognised this symbiosis, 
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noting that civil society’s position would further be weakened once the donors’ 
influence on government policies decreases. Donor informants said that it was already 
visible that the government was less interested in listening to donors than before, 
although revenue flows from natural resources were still limited. Thus foreign aid may 
be decreasing its meaning as a governance technique.  
In general, government informants were reluctant to see the decision to implement the 
EITI as caused by pressure from civil society or donors and stressed it was the 
government’s voluntary choice. Civil society informants had a different view. They 
considered that the government had signed up for the EITI because of outside pressure. 
Civil society informants viewed that the government as a whole was not genuinely 
committed to increasing transparency and reducing corruption. As one of them (CSO A) 
noted: “The government is contradicting itself [by committing to a transparency 
initiative while attempting to ensure private gains from the extractive sector]”. Civil 
society informants largely framed this situation as resulting in ‘benefits for the 
population’ being overridden by ‘benefits for the elite’. Civil society informants viewed 
that governance of the extractive sector is only legitimate if civil society has full ability 
to monitor the state and companies. It seems that civil society informants considered 
that the actual purpose of civil society participation in the EITI was to legitimise 
governance, rather than to provide civil society more options and influence over 
governance. 
Government informants’ statements, on the other hand, suggested that the government 
was defending state-centred governance, including patrimonial practices, while adopting 
elements of neoliberal governance. My data suggest that the government was balancing 
between maintaining the authority of the state as a vehicle of governance and adopting 
governance techniques that allow private and non-governmental actors to participate in 
decision-making. Civil society informants’ demands for legitimacy based on 
transparency and access to information may derive from discontent in state-centred 
governance and the failure of legitimacy based on reciprocity. It seems that in the light 
of resource discoveries and a growing sense of inequality, the state has not met the 
demand for reciprocity that legitimises patrimonial governance. In addition to this, 
transnational influences and governmental mechanisms, such as foreign development 
funding, direct actors towards adopting new forms of neoliberal governance. 
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6.2 The state remains a central hub 
A neoliberal understanding of governance involves shifting ideas about the role of the 
state and other actors. Decision-making and regulation involving non-state actors are 
considered more efficient and democracy-enhancing (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007). The 
EITI includes the assumption that states should not govern natural resources alone. Thus 
joining the initiative could be seen as supporting the idea of the defeat of the state. 
However, if thinking through the terms of governmentality, the government’s choice to 
take up the EITI does not show as ‘giving up’ power to other actors. Instead it is a 
reformulation of the state’s role in natural resource governance. My interviews show 
that within EITI Mozambique, the state remains a pivotal actor and a central locus of 
power struggles and techniques of governance.  
Mozambique has not included the EITI in the national legislation, except mentioning 
that companies are required to disclose payments and results to the state (Petroleum 
Law, 21/2014). For example Liberia and Nigeria have specific EITI laws. Thus changes 
in governmental policies may affect EITI implementation quite rapidly. This setting 
makes the state extremely central for the EITI process. It does not, however, entail that 
politicians and government officials are able to dominate and other groups are left 
without any influence. Stakeholders within and outside the government use a variety of 
techniques, including promoting the EITI and participating in it, to influence legislation 
and other state mechanisms to further their agendas. 
Company and civil society informants agreed that ultimately it is the government who 
regulates the operations of companies. As a civil society informant (CSO D) noted: “the 
government can put pressure on companies to do what the government wants because 
when companies invest in a country they must meet the government’s requirements”. 
Another civil society informant (CSO C) argued that “if the government were more 
open to the proposals civil society made on the Coordinating Committee, companies 
would follow”.  
Companies preferred not to openly confront the government. Interviews with company 
representatives suggested that companies did not wish to replace state mechanisms of 
regulation, but they wished to steer state regulation into a direction that is beneficial for 
their business. Several company informants mentioned that the government had 
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understood that it needed international investments. This idea of the necessity of foreign 
investments is observable also in the current development paradigms, which seem to 
serve the business interests of the Mozambican political elite. This guides the conduct 
of the government towards investor-friendly policies, without requirements or wishes 
that the companies participate in decision-making directly.   
There seemed to be competing programmes within the state apparatus, thus treating the 
government as a monolith would be misleading (Rose et al., 2006). Individual 
bureaucrats and politicians had differing interests ranging from career ambitions and 
personal enrichment to varying ideas of national economic and social development. 
Informants from outside the government brought up that there were good and bad, as 
well as capable and incapable officials within the government and its institutions. As a 
civil society informant (CSO E), who was quite critical of the government, noted: 
“There are serious people in the government who are against the system” (translated by 
the author). A civil society informant (CSO A) highlighted the key role some 
government institutions, such as the Ministry for Mineral Resources and the Central 
Bank, had in formulating the government’s approach. At the same time, this informant 
noted that it was difficult for these institutions to influence the decisions of the Council 
of Ministers, because some high-level leaders had personal business interests.  
Another civil society informant (CSO C) argued that government officials did not admit 
the problems of corruption and rent-seeking because they were afraid of losing their 
jobs. This indicates that dominant strategies within the government were not those of 
genuine transparency, and that a risk of expulsion from the state apparatus was related 
to non-conformity. As the informant (CSO C) noted “good people working for the 
government often became frustrated and leave to work for the private sector”. Another 
civil society informant (CSO D) stated: “I wouldn’t say that the government has 
personal objectives to benefit economically. Because the government is made up of 
people” (translated by the author),  
Thus in the governance of the extractive sector in Mozambique, the actors from 
different sectors employed techniques of governance to promote their agendas through 
mechanisms of the state. Conducting the conduct of others through the state apparatus 
was a central strategy. Thus the state remains a central hub, a crossing-point of 
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technologies of governance. The fact that the state can choose to comply with the EITI 
or resign from it whenever it wishes, sets decisions made about and within the EITI in 
the realm of the state. Most government informants expressed strongly that the decision 
to implement the EITI was initiated by the government, and it was the result of the 
government’s own voluntary will. Other stakeholders had opposite views. 
A theme that constantly came up in my interviews with civil society representatives was 
that the state always takes minimal actions to address critique from donors and civil 
society. Civil society informants argued that the government only cared about the 
international recognition it gained from EITI compliance and had no need to go further. 
Development partners shared this view. As a civil society informant (CSO A) argued: 
“The biggest enemy of this discussion [of including nationally relevant elements to the 
EITI] is the government, which does not allow other questions, such as the negative 
impact of the extractive sector, to be included in the initiative” (translated by the 
author). The informants also agreed that the EITI cannot be relevant without the genuine 
commitment of the government. A CSO representative stopped attending the meetings 
of the multi-stakeholder group because his views were not heard, and the civil society 
representatives engaged in the EITI stated their frustration about government and 
private sector representatives teaming up against civil society.  
Both civil society and donor informants indicated that the political elite were exploiting 
the state apparatus to gain access to resource wealth. For this, the political elite need 
investments from foreign corporations. The companies on the other hand need the 
political elite, the gatekeeper to the state apparatus, to gain necessary licences to 
operate. By participating in the EITI, the government sends a message that Mozambique 
is open for investment and listens to development partners. The companies gain a 
positive image by meeting requirements for corporate social responsibility and being 
able to show that they pay taxes.  
The personal financial advantage the political elite get from the EITI by attracting 
investment and foreign aid, is an unexpected by-product of the EITI in Mozambique. 
This shows that techniques of governance may have unintended outcomes and the EITI 
may shape the power relations in unforeseen ways (Rose & Miller, 1992). Another 
example of this phenomenon is development aid’s effect on governance. Foreign aid 
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enables the government of Mozambique to provide fiscal incentives to multinational 
companies and thus in practice to finance them. Without aid, incentives would not be 
possible, because the state would be unable to provide services without revenues and a 
political collapse would follow. (Barroso, 2012.) Thus foreign aid has increased the 
possibilities of action of the government, while promoting techniques of governing 
deriving from neoliberal rationality. 
The EITI can be seen as filling gaps in the Mozambican governance structure (Benner et 
al., 2004). The EITI includes the idea that without the support of a multi-stakeholder 
initiative that promotes good governance, Mozambique’s natural resource wealth may 
be less likely to lead to poverty reduction. Civil society and company participation is 
expected to improve governance. (EITI, 2013.) When viewed from this angle, ‘filling 
gaps’ is a normative project underlining the incapacity of the state to govern. Foreign 
aid has acted as a technique for translating this normative project into a concrete 
governance mechanism, the EITI in Mozambique. 
Capacity is an important factor when analysing state actions and changes in governance. 
Donor informants pointed out that the lack of capacity was a more important factor 
explaining ‘bad choices’ by the government than corruption. A civil society informant 
noted that licenses were allocated without careful social or economic impact 
assessments. A commonly held view was that the sharp increase in the prospecting of 
minerals, combined with the low level of expertise and limited financial resources of 
ministries could lead to a situation that would not be optimal for the country’s 
development. Informants brought up that the legal expertise of multinational mining and 
oil companies was on a more advanced level, even though the government of 
Mozambique was receiving external technical support for example from Norway. 
Several government and donor informants mentioned that ministries suffered from brain 
leakage as talented and ambitious officials opted for a better salary in private 
companies.  
The view of several informants was that the government did not have a sustainable 
long-term plan for the extractive sector. Some informants viewed this as an issue of the 
lack of capacity, some perceived it more as a ‘scramble for the wealth’, where different 
stakeholders aimed to ensure benefits from the lucrative extractive sector. As a donor 
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informant pointed out, patronage is one factor behind the low wages that pushes public 
officials to the private sector. Cutting jobs in the public sector and increasing the 
salaries of the remaining civil servants would be politically risky.  
The development partners’ general tendency to stress weak institutional capacity instead 
of corrupt intentions may be partly explained by their need to justify their presence in 
the country. From the perspective of governmentality, the way government’s tasks are 
defined is highly relevant. The EITI involves a certain set of tasks:  being transparent 
and accountable, setting business-friendly but socially and environmentally sound 
regulation and monitoring compliance and promoting inclusive decision-making. A 
different political rationality may lead to different understandings of the state’s tasks, 
stressing for example security issues or laissez-faire ideologies and cutting public 
regulation to a minimum. The government’s inability to meet the regulatory tasks opens 
up opportunities for foreign governments, the private sector and non-governmental 
actors to engage in governance. This opportunity does not need to derive from the actual 
inability of the government to perform its tasks, it is sufficient that there is a commonly 
shared perception that the government has insufficient capacity. ‘Weak capacity’ can 
also be seen as a technique of governance deployed by the government in order to 
delegate responsibilities to donors and companies.  
Development partners provide technical support on negotiating contracts with 
companies and preparing legislation to guide the extractive sector. Foreign assistance as 
a technique of governing thus has considerable influence on regulating the sector. 
Through financing a significant share of the state budget, donors are able to transmit 
policies stemming from a neoliberal rationality. Donor and company informants pointed 
out that the government officials often rely on the information provided by the 
companies, as they do not have the capacity to independently monitor the exploration 
and production operations. Companies also assumed tasks of the government by 
building transport infrastructure, and organising educational programmes to train 
engineers. A civil society informant (CSO A) argued that the concessions the state made 
to the mining companies had similarities with arrangements the Portuguese made in the 
colonial era. In the 19
th
 century, large territories, and social and economic activities 
within them, were controlled by enterprises that assumed tasks from the colonial state, 
which was not able to control the entire country. Here colonial and neoliberal 
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governance hold an unexpected resemblance as in both cases private actors are assigned 
governmental tasks due to the inability of the government to perform them.  
The lack of technical capacity of the state weakens its role as a central hub. It gives 
more space to donors and companies to produce information, set targets and execute 
policies. Legislative power still ensures that the state remains a pivotal actor as it largely 
defines the rights and responsibilities of other actors. Thus non-state actors can 
influence legislation only through techniques of governing in the realm of the state. This 
keeps them within the network of governance. However, there is no reason to assume 
that the agendas of different actors are always competing. They may also overlap and 
the operationalisation of a programme may further the interests of other actors and 
promote their agendas. This is the case when the interests of the political elite are 
furthered when the restrictions put on companies are loosened.  .   
Overall, the state apparatus seems to be a pivotal hub and a passage way of influence for 
diverse actors involved in the networks of governance. Its position and commitment are 
vital for EITI Mozambique and according to informants largely determines its 
relevance. The expectations that non-governmental and private actors have concerning 
the state are also a remarkable sign of the state’s central role. Interviewed company 
representatives placed the responsibility for creating benefits from the extractive 
industries on the government’s shoulders. A quote from the CEO of a multinational 
company working in the extractive sector clearly crystalizes this view: “So there are 
things that are improving the lives of people up there [in the north] but there is no 
simple solution. We are carefully considering how we can do our part. But the 
government has to take the biggest role”. Company informants noted that they pay their 
taxes and from there on, it is the government’s responsibility to ensure the fair 
distribution of the benefits. One company informant also brought up the companies’ 
expectations as tax payers. According to this informant, companies have financed large 
infrastructure projects, which in fact should have be done by the government with the 
tax revenues received.  
The importance of revenue distribution is fundamental because of the fact that large-
scale extractive industries are generally not very labour-intensive. Under these 
conditions the state was considered to remain the prime actor responsible for the well-
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being of the population. From the interviews with government informants it was clear 
that the state was considered the primary deliverer of the country’s development and 
that it plans to use revenues from the extractive sector to build physical and social 
infrastructure. Development partners confirmed the view that government revenues are 
likely to be Mozambique’s greatest benefit from the gas and mining industries. 
Decisions about the utilisation of this revenue remain firmly within the state apparatus. 
Other informants also placed primary responsibility for ensuring that resources will 
benefit the population on the government’s shoulders. As a civil society informant 
(CSO D) stated: “The government is responsible for its people”. The same informant 
noted that the citizens need to hold the government accountable. 
Neoliberal and neopatrimonial understandings of legitimacy were combined in these 
views on the government’s responsibility. On the one hand, the government’s 
legitimacy derived from reciprocity, the benefits could provide to the people (Pitcher et 
al., 2009). As a company informant noted: “The government needs development to 
remain in power”. By this statement the informant meant that unless the living 
conditions of the population were improved, the Frelimo government would not be able 
to stay in power. On the other hand, most informants across different sectors had 
adopted rhetoric from the neoliberal rationality, stressing that the government needed to 
be transparent and accountable to citizens. In other words, not only the ‘end’ but also 
the ‘means’ of governing the extractive sector mattered to informants.  
While neoliberal governance assigns responsibilities to non-state and private actors, in 
Mozambique the state remains the central apparatus through which neoliberal 
governmental techniques are deployed. At the same time, neoliberal techniques are 
influenced by and intertwined with preceding state-centred and patrimonial techniques 
of governance. Actors utilise a wide range of governmental techniques to further their 
programmes. Neoliberal techniques are selectively utilised by civil society, companies 
and donors to influence how the state governs the extractive sector.  
6.3 Private and non-governmental actors in mineral resource governance 
Defining who can participate is a crucial question in multi-stakeholder governance. EITI 
shapes perceptions of the process of legitimate decision-making by requiring 
transparency and the participation of civil society and extractive companies. EITI 
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requires that the government ensures that civil society and oil, gas and mining 
companies are fully and effectively engaged in EITI implementation. The government is 
required to establish a multi-stakeholder group that guides the EITI process in the 
country. (EITI, 2011, p. 14.) Inclusive decision-making, in which each stakeholder 
group is treated as a partner, is required at every stage. The EITI rules do not, however, 
determine the size of the multi-stakeholder group or the number of representatives from 
different sectors, only that each sector should be “adequately represented”. (Ibid., p.17.) 
Neither do the rules define precisely what is meant by civil society. These definitions 
and decisions are made at country level. 
My interviews suggest that in Mozambique the government largely decided the 
composition of the multi-sectorial Coordinating Committee, with four representatives 
from each of the three sectors: government, civil society, extractive companies. Two 
civil society representatives (from the organisations CIP and IESE) were openly 
selected by organisations from the civil society ‘G20’ coalition. This coalition predates 
the EITI, and is not focused on the extractive sector specifically. Out of the two 
remaining civil society seats, one was reserved for the media and one for the academia. 
The media representative at this time was employed by the state radio and the member 
from the academia represented the association of geologists, although originally the 
same person represented universities. Civil society informants pointed out that as 
geologists were mainly employed by oil, gas and mining companies, there was an 
obvious conflict of interests. The representative of the fully state-funded radio faced a 
similar conflict of interest. (CSO informants, Adam Smith International, 2011.)  
Interestingly there were different understandings among the  informants about who 
selected the civil society members of the Coordinating Committee. Even the Validation 
Report, produced by an independent party to assess whether Mozambique met all EITI 
requirements, was not able to determine how the representative of the academia, and 
later of geologists, had been selected (Adam Smith International, 2011). Government 
representatives stressed that civil society had selected its own members to the multi-
stakeholder group, while civil society informants disagreed, saying that they had only 
selected two out of four. This disagreement shows that to assess how participation in 
multi-stakeholder governance is legitimised, it is important to consider how different 
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stakeholder groups are defined. Defining legitimate participation is a technique of 
governance. 
In the case of EITI Mozambique, the state seems to have been able to break up the 
composition of the civil society block and vest it with competing interests. Government 
representatives claimed that each constituency had selected their own representatives 
but that journalists and geologists could not be left out. The government thus had a 
privilege in defining who constituted civil society. However, if the government wishes 
the country to remain EITI compliant, it needs the cooperation of private and non-
governmental actors. According to the EITI rules, the government alone cannot steer the 
process. Government officials may intend to manipulate the structures of the national 
EITI process to undermine agendas that conflict with their interests; still, the 
government is tightly knitted into the network of governance, which has the state 
apparatus as its central locus.  
It was contested whether Maputo-based civil society represented the population of 
regions where resource extraction took place. Civil society informants themselves stated 
that organisations that made demands on behalf of these communities often had very 
weak links to them. As a civil society informant (CSO A) stated: “Mozambican civil 
society is elitist. It is a small circle that does not represent the thinking of the 
Mozambican people” (translated by the author).  Civil society informants, however, also 
brought up that at least capital-based CSOs were holding the government and 
companies accountable by drawing attention to mismanagement. Donor informants 
were more willing to accept that Maputo-based CSOs represented community interests 
in the EITI, as they did not see another solution. The question of representation is not 
independent from the role that is given to civil society. Two competing understandings 
of the role of civil society within the EITI were observable in my interviews.  
Mainly civil society informants viewed that civil society participated in the governance 
of the extractive sector on behalf of the population as a decision-maker that was equal 
with government and companies. According to this view, civil society represents the 
citizens’ interests. Government informants viewed civil society’s role differently. They 
considered that its role within the EITI was to receive and use the data disclosed in EITI 
reports. Reaching out to communities across the country was highlighted by many 
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government and company informants. For them, the purpose of this outreach was 
largely to disseminate information. Some government and company informants also 
recognised monitoring the activities or the government and companies as part of civil 
society’s role. Government and company informants did not however consider the EITI 
as a platform to discuss how the sector should be governed. They largely considered the 
Coordinating Committee as a technical working group in which the practicalities of 
publishing data were agreed. Civil society’s role was thus to use the data without 
‘misinterpreting’ it.  
The EITI assigns a dual role to civil society. Civil society is a watchdog of those in 
power but simultaneously civil society itself is turned into a decision-maker. The EITI 
requires that “civil society be actively engaged as a participant in the design, monitoring 
and evaluation of the process” (EITI, 2011, p.20). As national EITI processes can and 
often do disclose more information than required in the rules, EITI can open up a space 
for civil society to participate actively in the governance of the extractive sector. On the 
other hand, the EITI also assigns civil society with the responsibility to disseminate 
information and contribute to public debate about the governance of oil, gas and mining 
industries (ibid). In its dual role civil society is expected to participate in decision-
making within the EITI and to spread the information published in EITI reports, both to 
inform the public and to hold the government and companies accountable. Based on my 
interviews, it seems that government and most company informants gave the second 
role, dissemination of information, more priority than participation in the decision-
making.  
Several civil society informants considered Mozambican civil society fragmented, and 
there was no common view on what civil society means. As a civil society informant 
(CSO C) noted: “I think in Mozambique there is a need to discuss what we mean with 
civil society, what is civil society. And what kind of civil society should be in the EITI.” 
The organisations involved in extractive sector governance ranged from environmental 
organisations to farmers’ unions and academic think-tanks. CSO representatives often 
brought up that Mozambican civil society was weak. However, different explanations 
for this were provided. Informants blamed lack of resources and capacity, as well as 
lack of cooperation and common goals. Both civil society informants and donor 
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informants mentioned that few organisations did good background research and just 
echoed the opinions of a few individuals. 
The competing programmes within civil society were demonstrated in difficulties in 
coordination and cooperation among civil society organisations . The stagnation of the 
work of the Platform of Civil Society on Natural Resources and the Extractive Industry 
in Mozambique shows divisions within civil society. The platform is a forum of 
national and international NGOs that aims to share information, build civil society 
capacity and collaborate in advocacy work regarding natural resources and the 
extractive industries. It has also communicated statements to the EITI Committee 
together with another civil society platform, the G20. (PSCRN, 2012.) The platform’s 
purpose is to facilitate communication between the CSO representatives on the 
Coordinating Committee and other organisations. At the time I conducted my 
interviews for this study, the work of the platform had seized in practice. 
The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) led the platform, which caused dispute for two 
reasons. Firstly, the Mozambican WWF awarded a prize to President Guebuza, which 
upset other civil society representatives, since the president has been widely criticized 
for rent-seeking. Secondly, the legal status of international NGOs is weaker than that of 
national organisations. Foreign associations are required to gain an authorization from 
the Council of Ministers and their aims must not contravene with national public policy 
(§17, Lei das Associações, 8/91). As a civil society informant (CSO E) noted: “The 
more divided we are or the more we work in isolation, the less possible it is for us to put 
real pressure against the powerful. And they take advantage of that” (translated by the 
author). By this notion the informant emphasized the advantage the government 
achieves from civil society being fragmented and disorganised. Controlling the status of 
international NGOs and fragmenting civil society by involving state-affiliated persons 
in the civil society block of the Coordinating Committee are techniques of governance 
that limit civil society’s possibilities to affect the agenda of the EITI.  
Dependence on foreign, mostly North American and West European funding, steers 
both civil society and the government to adapt to the neoliberal political rationalities 
that drive the current development paradigm in Mozambique. As a civil society 
informant (CSO E) noted, “many CSOs were now working on mineral resources 
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because they were in fashion”. Another civil society informant stated that donor 
preferences affected civil society’s agenda and thus tax justice, for example, did not 
receive sufficient attention. The EITI has been a priority for development partners who 
made Mozambique’s EITI compliance a performance indicator affecting budget 
support. As CSOs are largely funded by foreign donors, the donors’ preferences shape 
the agenda-setting of CSOs. 
Some donor informants viewed civil society’s positions as too extreme and wished for 
more ‘constructive’ dialogue between civil society and the government and companies. 
As a donor informant (DEV B) noted, “CSOs and government both interpret data 
according to their ideology and the propaganda they want to put out. It can help 
reinforce the two-sidedness of all these debates and doesn’t necessarily help bring 
parties together to discuss some of the issues.” This statement underpins the ideals of 
dialogue and deliberation among different stakeholders, as opposed to conflict and 
confrontation. Donor views may guide CSOs towards less confrontational positions on 
extractive sector governance. 
Donor informants brought up that the environment in Mozambique  is significantly 
more allowing civil society than for example in Angola or Tanzania and that local civil 
society was actually rather vibrant. Interviews with representatives of civil society 
revealed that many informants considered that the government’s approach to NGOs 
depends on the organisations’ function. Service-providing organisations are awarded 
but advocacy work is frowned upon. It seems that there is a difference in the 
government’s approach to civil society in Maputo compared to the rest of the country. 
Repressive and restricting practices applied by local authorities were noted also by other 
civil society informants. State security officers harassed and threatened inhabitants of a 
relocated community in the coal-producing province of Tete for organising a 
community committee. Similar cases were witnessed in the ruby-mining region of 
Montepuez (Seminar by JA! & Kepa, November 2012). This indicates that neoliberal 
governance has gained a stronger foothold in Maputo than in the provinces.  
It is important to make a difference between the opportunities the written rules of the 
EITI give for different stakeholder groups and the practical implementation. The EITI 
reacts and adjusts to existing power relations and practices. Dingwerth (2004) presents 
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participation in decision-making processes as a two-fold issue. One must ask whether 
those affected by a decision are able to participate in decision-making, as well as to 
what extent they are able to participate. Participation is thus a matter of scope and 
quality. Similarly, in multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the EITI Mozambique, the 
formal, written rules that enable civil society members’ participation may be distant 
from its real opportunities to influence decision-making. Based on my interviews, it 
seems that civil society had less influence on the governance of the extractive sector 
than the formal rules would lead one to think. 
The decision-making structures of the EITI place civil society in a difficult position. On 
the one hand, it is meant to act as a watchdog, using the information provided by reports 
to make the government accountable for the use of revenues. On the other hand, it is a 
negotiating party within the multi-stakeholder group, cooperating with the state and 
companies to find optimal solutions. Civil society organisations make strategic choices 
in how they position themselves in relation to the EITI, the state and companies. As 
noted by company representatives, some NGOs opted to collaborate with the private 
sector, while others chose a more radical stance. In the evaluation of private sector 
informants, some NGOs were unconstructive and according to them several companies 
were unfairly blamed for the mistakes of other companies by some civil society 
organisations and the media. The heterogeneity of civil society was visible also in 
interviews with civil society representatives. Some NGOs working on land issues and 
natural resources opted for cooperation with the government and companies while 
others were more inclined to radical statements and confrontation. 
Representatives of the private sector were very willing to give interviews. They spoke 
openly and did not appear uncomfortable when questioned about transparency, 
corruption and corporate responsibility. It seemed that representatives of big mining and 
gas companies were used to facing these questions.  In some cases, their manner of 
speaking seemed pretentious, like a memorized speech about contributing to the 
development of Mozambique and the importance of transparency. Company informants 
also assured that they were willing to disclose more information if required so. Some 
company informants noted that they benefit from transparency, as it shows that they 
indeed do pay taxes.  
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The requirements some companies face outside of the EITI help explain their position. 
As a civil society informant (CSO B) noted: 
“Some companies are willing to do more because they feel that they are 
bounded by more regulation in the European Union and some others are not. So 
it’s better for them if the standards are raised so they are competing in a more 
level [playing field]. So there are a lot of companies willing to do more, but the 
government isn’t willing to do more.”  
Another civil society informant repeated this view, noting that companies were willing 
to disclose contracts but the government was arguing that they should be confidential. 
He however mentioned that companies may have a different approach behind closed 
doors, when negotiating the contracts.  
The EITI can be seen as a governance technology that works to redefine and adjust the 
roles of different sectors of society. This shapes their interaction and relations through 
affecting what is expected from and permitted to each actor. The state is often present in 
the interactions between private actors and the wider population, either enabling or 
limiting them. Several informants stated that the government did not allow companies to 
communicate directly with the communities. According to the land legislation, 
acquiring a permission for land use (DUAT) requires consultations with the community 
to secure that the area is not occupied (§13, Land Law, 19/97). A technical annex was 
added to the land law in 1997. The annex states that communities and individuals 
holding a right to the land may independently engage with companies and in fact lease 
the land they have rights to. (The Oakland Institute, 2011, pp. 20-21.)  
Instead of companies communicating directly with the local population, local authorities 
managed the consultation processes and pointed out the areas reserved for resettling the 
population.  A donor informant confirmed that the government had forbidden some 
companies from talking directly with the communities and stated that the government 
did not understand its role in facilitating consultations. The companies suffered from 
bad publicity caused by complaints voiced by unsatisfied local residents and resettled 
communities. Social unrest is not beneficial for business in a sector where building 
extensive infrastructure is required and investments are often long term. For companies, 
the EITI follows rational market logics by enhancing an enabling, business-friendly 
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environment. Taking part in the EITI gives companies an opportunity to participate in 
formulating the discursive field of resource extraction and draw light to what has been 
paid. The EITI draws attention on revenue flows and inspires discussion about how 
revenues are used. It shifts the focus away from issues such as human rights abuses and 
environmental degradation. 
Despite claims that civil society was included in the governance of the extractive sector 
only to legitimise it, civil society organisations spoke positively about the EITI. Many 
saw it as having little, if any, impact but considered it better than nothing. As a civil 
society informant (CSO F) noted: “The EITI changes the mindset of people.” By this 
issue the informant meant that the EITI opened up a discussion about the governance of 
the extractive sector and legitimised demands for transparency and civil society 
participation. Although the EITI involves a set of prioritisation, focusing on revenue 
rather than a variety of other governance issues, it strenghtens the idea that civil society 
should be involved in setting the agenda of natural resource governance. As Ferguson 
(2010) notes, neoliberal governance can lead to solutions that are not ideologically 
neoliberal by opening up space for participation. Changes in governance do not follow 
prewritten scripts but can produce unexpected consequences (Rose & Miller, 1992). 
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7. Conclusions 
This study has analysed how the extractive industries are rendered governable through 
the EITI, a global multi-stakeholder governance mechanism. I have studied how 
changing understandings of the role of state, private and non-governmental actors shape 
mineral resource governance in Mozambique. This study has resulted in four key 
findings: 
1. The state remains a central locus for mineral resource governance; 
2. Transnational influences direct Mozambique towards adopting neoliberal 
techniques of governance; 
3. The adoption of a neoliberal understanding of governance is not complete and 
different techniques are mixed in mineral resource governance; 
4. Despite Mozambique’s EITI compliance, civil society has limited influence on 
mineral resource governance. The EITI, however, legitimises demands for 
stronger civil society participation. 
Firstly, my study has demonstrated that the state remains a central locus for mineral 
resource governance in Mozambique. The EITI underpins the state’s role as a central 
hub for natural resource governance by assigning the government a leading role in the 
process. The government of Mozambique has been able to restrict the EITI from 
becoming a governance mechanism going beyond the international minimum 
requirements. The government was also largely able to define the structure of the multi-
stakeholder Coordinating Committee, and to fragment civil society representation. In 
general, the government continues to defend the legitimacy of state-centred governance. 
While the liberal attributes of transparency and accountability are accepted, they are 
viewed as internal to the state system and predating EITI implementation. 
Neoliberal governance assigns responsibilities to non-state and private actors but in 
Mozambique the state remains the central apparatus through which neoliberal 
techniques of governance are deployed. While private and non-governmental actors aim 
to influence how the state operates, the government is seen as having main 
responsibility for development. All stakeholders assign this role to the government.  
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The widely shared view that the government has weak capacity to govern the extractive 
sector in Mozambique opens up opportunities for foreign governments, the private 
sector, and non-governmental actors to participate in governance. However, these actors 
need to deploy techniques of governing through the state apparatus. 
Secondly, this study demonstrates that the Mozambican government’s decision to 
implement the EITI reflects how transnational influences, such as development aid and 
foreign investment, direct developing countries towards adopting neoliberal techniques 
of governance. My findings suggest that the government of Mozambique decided to 
implement the EITI primarily to attract development aid (David-Barrett and Okamura, 
2013). A secondary reason was that the EITI was considered beneficial for attracting 
foreign investment.  
The third finding of this study is that in Mozambique neoliberal forms of resource 
governance are mixed with conventional forms of resource governance in several ways. 
The adoption of a neoliberal understanding of governance is not complete.  
Different stakeholder groups utilise techniques of neoliberal governance selectively to 
further their agendas. Different groups emphasized different aspects of the neoliberal 
political rationality in their views on the EITI. Government informants stressed 
cooperation and dialogue, while civil society informants focused on accountability and 
access to information. Company informants valued respect for contracts and 
cooperation.  
Extractive sector governance involves many neopatrimonial elements, such as the 
blurring of the line between personal and public interests. The Frelimo party has control 
over much of the state apparatus and political elite are actively involved in the 
extractive sector. Echoing Etter’s (2014) findings from Azerbaijan, it seems that the cost 
of EITI implementation for the political elite with personal business interests is low. 
According to civil society, EITI implementation has very limited impact on corrupt 
practices. 
Neoliberal techniques are thus influenced by and intertwined with state-centred and 
patrimonial techniques of governance. Different techniques are selectively utilised by 
civil society actors, companies and donors to influence how the state governs the 
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extractive sector. The agendas of different actors overlap and complement each other. 
The political elite and foreign investors both benefit from increased investment in the 
extractive sector. Civil society and development partners share the objectives of 
increasing transparency, accountability and civil society participation although they see 
little progress in these fields in practice.   
Neopatrimonial techniques of governance contradict with the neoliberal political 
rationality and the prevailing ‘good governance’ paradigm. It seems that in 
Mozambique, the government is balancing between maintaining the authority of the 
state as a vehicle of governance and adopting governance techniques that allow private 
and non-governmental actors to participate in decision-making. Civil society 
informants’ demands for legitimacy based on transparency and access to information 
may derive from discontent in state-centred governance and the failure of legitimacy 
based on reciprocity. It seems that in the light of resource discoveries and a growing 
sense of inequality, the state has not lived up to the demand for reciprocity that 
legitimises patrimonial governance. 
For the government, and to some extent for the companies, the purpose of the EITI 
seems to be to produce information that reduces citizens’ discontent. Through providing 
information on the contribution of extractive companies and by ‘correcting’ civil 
society’s expectations on the distribution of benefits, the government and companies 
shape the views how the sector is understood. Instead of promoting public debate, the 
aim seems to be to manage discontent.  
The EITI in Mozambique can be understood to be both a distraction and a compromise. 
It is a way for the government to respond to pressure from civil society and 
development partners without interfering with the personal interests of the political and 
business elite. This distracts the focus away from issues not included in EITI’s scope. 
At the same time, EITI implementation represents a compromise between government, 
company, civil society and donor interests. Governance based on a state-centred and 
partly patrimonial rationality is intertwined with neoliberal techniques of governance, 
which base their understanding of legitimate governance on features such as 
transparency. 
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The fourth finding of this study is that while civil society’s role in mineral resources 
governance remains limited, the EITI may open up opportunities for civil society to 
influence governance. Despite remaining a central hub, the state does not control the 
governance of the extractive sector. Using the EITI as a governance technique shows 
that the government and companies have difficulties in controlling the production and 
dissemination of information regarding the extractive sector. By making information 
available to civil society and the media they can attempt to steer the type of information 
guiding public debate but at the same time they open a window for civil society to 
interpret and use the information in competing ways. 
The government was able to fragment civil society representation on the EITI 
Coordinating Committee, which weakened the EITI as a governance mechanism and 
restricted civil society’s influence of natural resource governance. Civil society has less 
influence in practice than on paper, and it is partly involved just to legitimise the 
process. The EITI assigns a dual role to civil society: to participate in decision-making 
and to communicate with citizens. The government and companies stress the second 
role, while undermining civil society as a decision-maker. However, the fact that 
involving civil society is considered necessary for legitimacy is a sign of adopting the 
neoliberal political rationality. 
While civil society’s influence on the scope and content of EITI Mozambique is limited, 
the EITI underpins the idea that civil society should participate in the governance of the 
extractive sector. The EITI offers civil society a mechanism to demand more 
transparency and participation. The wide acceptance of the neoliberal rationality behind 
the EITI makes these claims legitimate. This supports Ferguson’s (2010) notion that 
neoliberal governance is not necessarily tied to neoliberal ideology. 
The case of EITI Mozambique shows that the form multi-stakeholder governance takes 
in a certain setting reflects wider power relations in society. It is also evident that the 
understanding of legitimacy the EITI builds upon derives from a neoliberal rationality 
and that mechanisms of natural resource governance deriving from other rationalities 
may involve different understandings of legitimacy. The form of the EITI process in 
Mozambique is unique to the country, as it is a result of the internationally-agreed 
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governance model interacting with more state-centred and neopatrimonial techniques of 
governance.  
Finally, while the findings on EITI Mozambique are based on a certain context, some 
findings of this research may be applicable to other EITI implementing countries. The 
global trends of increasing economic integration and a strong global civil society can be 
translated into national contexts through transnational techniques of governance such as 
development aid and foreign investment. However, EITI implementation does not 
necessarily entail full adoption of the neoliberal political rationality. Instead, neoliberal 
techniques of governance can be used selectively together with other techniques and 
strategies. Stakeholders may also assign purposes to the EITI that differ from those 
stated in the EITI Principles.  
While the EITI is undoubtedly a normative project, including ideas about the desired 
state of matters, it also involves an element of surprise. The implications of the EITI, as 
any governance mechanism, cannot be determined beforehand and may not reflect the 
intended outcomes. EITI Mozambique meets the expectations of the EITI Principles 
only partly, as civil society’s participation is limited. It however consolidates the idea 
that civil society should take part in natural resource governance. This may in the future 
open up more significant opportunities for non-governmental actors to influence the 
agenda on natural resource governance. 
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Interviews conducted for the study in Maputo, Mozambique 
Code Date 
Government officials engaged in the extractive sector 
GOV A 12.02.2013 
GOV B 11.02.2013 
GOV C 21.01.2013 
GOV D 10.01.2013 
GOV E 08.02.2013 
Civil society: NGOs and research institutes engaged in or following the EITI  
CSO A  12.12.2012 
CSO B 11.12.2012 
CSO C 14.01.2013 
CSO D 07.02.2013 
CSO E 05.02.2013 
CSO F 18.01.2013 
Companies working in the extractive sector  
COM A 24.01.2013 
COM B 05.02.2013 
COM C 16.01.2013 
COM D 06.02.2013 
COM E 21.01.2013 
Bilateral and multilateral development partners 
DEV A 15.01.2013 
DEV B 17.01.2013 
DEV C 23.01.2013 
Independent consultant studying the extractive sector 
CON A 06.12.2013 
 
